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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in denying the motions to intervene filed by Willie Jessop, 
Dan Johnson, Merlin Jessop, Lyle Jeffs and James Oler (the "FLDS Intervenors") where 
the FLDS Intervenors sought to intervene in a judicial administration of a charitable trust 
that had many years earlier been reformed to be a purely non-sectarian charitable trust, 
the FLDS Intervenors had failed to seek pre-reformation intervention despite having 
notice of the trial court's administration of the Trust, and where the FLDS Intervenors 
proved no greater interest in administration of the Trust than thousands of other potential 
trust participants who also include non-FLDS members? 
"Denials of intervention as of right under rule 24(a) are subject to de novo review 
on appeal." Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495, 500 (Utah 2005) (citing In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
The Office of the Arizona Attorney General (the "Arizona AG") agrees with the 
FLDS Intervenors that Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is relevant to this 
appeal. 
The Arizona AG disagrees that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) is relevant. The 
FLDS Intervenors do not qualify as the settlors of the reformed trust, did not prove 
themselves the original settlers of even the predecessor United Effort Plan Trust (the 
"1998 Trust"), are not among the "others" contemplated by the statute, and are not 
1 
seeking to enforce a trust as presently constituted. Instead they seek only to undermine 
and reverse the reformation of the existing United Effort Plan Trust (the 'Trust"). 
The following additional statutes are relevant: 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-302 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-203 
The text of these statutes appears in the Appendix at Appendix " 1 " . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court denied two motions to intervene from the FLDS Intervenors that 
were filed almost 4 years after the trial court's administration of the Trust started, and 
some two and a half years after the trial court had issued a final reformation of the Trust 
that had become non-appealable. The trial court denied the motions. (R. 16376-77; R. 
16381-82). The trial court found that the motions to intervene provided insufficient 
grounds to justify an exception to the general rule that potential beneficiaries of a 
charitable trust have no right to intervene in a trust administration proceeding. (Id.) 
Though the motions claimed a right to intervene to object to a proposed sale of a 
particular piece of the Trust's property known as the Berry Knoll Farm because the farm 
property has alleged religious significance to members of the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Church" or "FLDS"), some of the FLDS 
Intervenors have sought to remove the Special Fiduciary and trial judge (see R. 14582-
84; R. 14551-78), and a group calling themselves the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints and using an affidavit from FLDS Intervenor Willie Jessop 
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have previously challenged the constitutionality of the trial court's non-appealable 
reformation order (Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 20090859). Thus, the motions are 
connected with attempts to gain standing for untimely objections to final trust 
administration decisions made years earlier. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the 1990's, residents of the Colorado City, Arizona and Hildale, Utah 
communities, some of whom had formerly been members of the Fundamentalist Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Church" or "FLDS"), sued a trust known 
as the United Effort Plan Trust (the "Original Trust") seeking to enforce equitable 
interests in properties of the Original Trust based on claims that they were promised the 
right to live on such properties throughout their life and had contributed to the Original 
Trust by improving the trust property they were allowed to use. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). The Original Trust was created in 1942 and stated the following 
purpose: 
The purpose and object of the trust shall first be charitable and 
philanthropic, its operations to be governed in a tru [sic] spirit of 
brotherhood, and to accomplish such purpose, it may engage in any and all 
kinds of legitimate business ventures; provided, however, that such 
endeavors or adventures of whatsoever name or nature shall in no wise 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or the constitutional laws 
of the land where such operations may be carried on." 
(R. 32 at T( VIII). All of the property originally comprising the corpus of the trust was 
located in Arizona. (R. 33-34, at ^ XII ["Membership in the trust estate is established for 
the signers of this instrument . . . by the conveyance to the trust estate of the following 
described property, situated in Mohave County, State of Arizona . . . ."]; see also R. 22-
3 
23, at Sec. I). At the time of the Original Trust's creation, just as today, the Constitution 
of the State of Arizona prohibited polygamy and plural marriage. See Ariz. Const., art. 
XX, Second ("Polygamous or plural marriages, or polygamous cohabitation, are forever 
prohibited within this State.") Thus, consistent with the purpose statement of the 
Original Trust, the trust could not have been created for the support of a religious 
doctrine encouraging polygamy or plural marriage. 
Subsequent amendments of the Original Trust authorized the trustees to "render 
assistance to non-members of the Trust when deemed wise by them.'5 (R. 45). Nor was 
the trust likely created for the benefit of the FLDS Church as a specific, formalized 
religious institution. Utah corporate records show that the Corporation of the President of 
the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints did not create its Articles 
of Incorporation until over forty years after the Original Trust was created. (See R. 
19241-43). 
When this Court held in Jeffs that the Original Trust was a private trust, not a 
charitable trust, and recognized that the non-FLDS residents could make out claims for 
equitable interests in Trust property, the existing settlors of the Original Trust restated the 
trust. (R. 21-27). They created The Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the 
United Effort Plan Trust in November, 1998 (the "1998 Trust"). (Id) Yet, non-FLDS 
residents continued to live on trust property. (R. 16448 (Transcript of July 29, 2009 
hearing) at pp. 20, 44-46, 77-78). The idea that the 1998 Trust served only to benefit 
faithful FLDS members is not true. 
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In 2004, the 1998 Trust was sued in two tort actions in Utah state court. (See R. 7-
8). The trustees of the 1998 Trust left the trust undefended in these actions when their 
attorneys withdrew explaining that "withdrawal from the representation is permitted 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(4) in that the clients insist upon a 
course of conduct with which their lawyers have a fundamental disagreement and upon 
the further ground that withdrawal from the representation is required under Rule 
1.16(a)(3), in that the lawyers have been discharged from representation of the defendants 
in this case." (R. 8; R. 51-67). When he withdrew as counsel, attorney Rodney Parker 
filed a notice that specifically acknowledged the enforceable interests of non-FLDS 
members in trust property that had been confirmed in Jeffs, and identified that other 
occupants of Trust properties may have similar claims. (See Memorandum of the Office 
of the Arizona Attorney General in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Exh. U 
at pp. 1-7, Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 20090859). His filing further recommended 
the District Court require notice be sent to an appropriate trust representative, "such as 
the Utah Attorney General" before any default was entered against the 1998 Trust for 
protection those individuals claiming an interest in the 1998 Trust's property. (See id. at 
2). 
The Utah Attorney General initiated the petition creating the trust administration 
proceeding from which this appeal arises on May 26, 2005. (R. 1-118). All of the former 
trustees were properly served. (See R. 301-370; R. 389-400; R. 423-429; R. 16973-
17010). This included Warren S. Jeffs who was then listed in Utah corporate records as 
the Corporation Sole of the FLDS Church. (See R. 17050-17051; R. 19242-19244). It 
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also included Leroy S. Jeffs, who has himself sought to intervene in this action claiming 
that he is the administrator of the estate of the late Rulon Jeffs, one of the original settlors 
of the Original Trust and a trustee at the time of the 1998 Trust amendment. (See R. 
16831-16869). One of the FLDS Intervenors, Willie Jessop, has provided a sworn 
statement to this Court that the FLDS members became aware of the trust administration 
proceeding in the trial court in 2005. (See Appendix "3" hereto (copy of Affidavit of 
Willie Jessop In Support of Petition for Extraordinary Writ dated October 16, 2009 in 
Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 20090859). 
Finally, the attorney who claims in earlier proceedings before this Court that he 
has represented the FLDS Church for some 18 years, Rodney Parker, continued to 
receive copies of the matters filed below throughout the trust administration proceedings, 
and he was named on the certificates of service as the agent of the Corporation of the 
President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (See R. 
16978-16982). At one point, when the Court was shaving its service list down, Mr. 
Parker formally requested from the trial court's Special Fiduciary that he be kept on the 
service list, and he was. (See R. 4001-4004). Mr. Parker was served with copies of the 
filings of various parties recommending reformation of the Trust, and with notice that the 
trial court was considering reforming the Trust. (See R. 169890, n. 4 (consolidating 
notices provided to Mr. Parker)). 
Thus, leadership and members of the FLDS church, including FLDS Intervenor 
Willie Jessop, were well aware of the trust administration proceedings by 2005, and had 
advance notice of the trial court's intention to reform the 1998 Trust. None of the FLDS 
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Intervenors have argued or provided any proof that they were not aware of the trust 
administration proceedings in the trial court long before the trial court reformed the Trust. 
Yet, FLDS Intervenors Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop filed 
nothing until August, 2008, almost two years after the trial court's October 26, 2006 
final order reforming the Trust. (R. 6537; R. 13193-13229)). Even then, these FLDS 
Intervenors did not seek leave to intervene under Utah R. Civ. P. 24, but only filed a 
motion seeking a stay of a potential sale of trust property known as the Berry Knoll Farm. 
(R. 13193-13229). Their moving papers alleged that the Berry Knoll Farm was used by 
the Colorado City and Hildale FLDS communities to produce food and for grazing 
livestock. (R. 13206-13207, at p. 11, ^ 29 - 12, Tf 31). They alleged that "[a] portion of 
the produce of the property goes directly to the Bishop's Storehouse for distribution to 
rank-and-file FLDS members according to their just wants and needs," that "[t]he surplus 
is sold commercially," and that by supporting the Bishop's Storehouse, the farm "feeds 
many members of the FLDS community." (Id. at 12, lfl| 30-31; see also R. 15257-15263, 
at T{ 9 [claiming "[pjroduce grown at the Berry Knoll farm is, from time to time, sent to 
the community in Bountiful [British Columbia] to assist with the support of members of 
the FLDS congregation."). The suggestion that the Berry Knoll Farm property was 
producing food in 2008 that was feeding many members of the FLDS community has 
been called into question in later proceedings. (See R. 16448 (transcript of July 29, 2009 
hearing) at pp. 21-23, 53). 
The trial court denied the August, 2008 motion for a stay filed by FLDS 
Intervenors Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop. (R. 14063-14085). None of 
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them sought intervention until they filed a motion to intervene on May 13, 2009.] (R. 
15219 - 15232). FLDS Intervenor Willie Jessop originally alleged only that "Movant 
Willie Jessop presently has a stewardship from priesthood leadership to graze cattle on 
the [Berry Knoll Farm] property." (R. 13207, at 12, ^ 29). When he finally moved for 
intervention in 2009, Mr. Jessop submitted an affidavit claiming that in 1994 he received 
a stewardship to graze cattle on "certain parts of the [Berry Knoll Farm] land," and that 
he has continued grazing cattle on parts of the farm since then. (R. 15214, at |^ 6). He 
never offered any proof of any lease or other written document granting him the right to 
use of any portion of the Berry Knoll Farm property or any other property of the Trust. 
(See id.) Nor has he ever specified who exactly granted him his stewardship, or provided 
any proof that the stewardship was granted by the trustees of the Original Trust or the 
1998 Trust as opposed to non-trustee religious leaders. Nor has he identified how much 
of the Berry Knoll Farm was included in his alleged stewardship. 
FLDS Intervenor Dan Johnson initially alleged in seeking a temporary restraining 
order in August, 2008, only that he "presently has a stewardship from priesthood 
leadership to operate the agricultural operations and feed lot on the [Berry Knoll Farm] 
property." (R. 13207, at ^ 29). When he moved to intervene in May, 2009, Mr. 
Johnson's affidavit asserted further that "[i]n about the year 2000, I was given a sacred 
stewardship to tend and care for the sheep for the FLDS Church in Colorado City, 
Arizona and Hildale, Utah," and that he tended the sheep by grazing them "on parts of the 
These movants admitted that the trial court had denied them standing earlier, "albeit 
not on a proper Motion to Intervene." (R. 15230). 
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Berry Knoll [Farm] lands." (R. 15202, at ^ 3). He further claimed that "I continue to use 
the Berry Knoll Farm lands . . .." (Id. at ^ 8). Mr. Johnson never provided proof that he 
had a "stewardship" specifically for use of the Berry Knoll Farm land or any other Trust 
property, and he never provided any lease or other written instrument granting him any 
interest in or right to use any property of the Trust. (See id.). Nor did he ever identify 
who specifically granted him the stewardship to raise sheep for the FLDS Church, or 
provide any proof that such persons were trustees of the 1998 Trust as opposed to non-
trustee FLDS religious leaders. 
FLDS Intervenor Merlin Jessop initially asserted in August, 2008 that he 
"presently has a stewardship from priesthood leadership to operate the agricultural 
operations and feed lot on the [Berry Knoll Farm] property. (R. 13207, at ^ 29). His 
May, 2009 affidavit in support of his motion to intervene further asserted that "[i]n about 
1987, after Berry Knoll became part of the Trust, I was granted [a] sacred stewardship to 
farm parts of it," and that "[s]ince that time, I have farmed Berry Knoll, including grazing 
and feeding cattle and planting and harvesting corn and grain under supervision of the 
Bishop." (R. 15208, at % 3). He further claimed that "I continue to use the Berry Knoll 
Farm and have never been removed . . .." (Id. at f 8). Merlin Jessop never provided any 
proof of any lease or other written document granting him any rights to use any portion of 
the Berry Knoll Farm or any Trust property. (See id.). Nor did he identify who 
specifically granted him any stewardship over the Berry Knoll Farm, provide any proof 
that the stewardship was granted by the trustees of the Original Trust or the 1998 Trust as 
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opposed to non-trustee FLDS religious leaders, or identify what portions of the Berry 
Knoll Farm property his stewardship purportedly extends to. 
The affidavits of FLDS Intervenors Oler and Jeffs concede that "[t]here is no 
formal conveyance involved in a grant of stewardship" over property by the FLDS 
Church leadership. (R. 15249-15256, at ^ 4; R. 15257-15263, at ^ 4). Thus, the 
stewardships claimed by FLDS Intervenors Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin 
Jessop are not supported by any formal, legal conveyance of any interest or right. 
By Minute Entry and Order filed November 10, 2008, the trial court denied the 
Motion to Stay filed by Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop, but, "in an effort 
to provide an opportunity for interested individuals to comment on the proposed sale [of 
the Berry Knoll Farm property] . . . the Court agreed to schedule another hearing" on the 
sale proposal. The trial court specifically authorized counsel for Willie Jessop, Dan 
Johnson and Merlin Jessop to coordinate and present testimony against the proposed sale 
from individuals opposing the sale. (R. 14063-14064, at ^J's 3, 6). 
FLDS Intervenors James Oler and Lyle Jeffs filed nothing before May, 2009. 
Finally, on May 21, 2009, they filed their motion to intervene. (R. 15264-15287). They 
do not claim to have any particular interest in any Trust properties, but instead claim that 
their roles as Bishops in the FLDS Church gave them responsibilities to administer the 
UEP Trust and distribute trust assets "according to the just wants and needs of the people 
in my congregation." (R. 15259 at ^ 5; R. 15251, at ^ 5). 
In responding to the FLDS Intervenors' motions to intervene and a related motion 
to stay all the trust proceedings, the Arizona AG argued that the motions were untimely, 
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particularly as the movants sought to challenge the reformation of the Trust which had 
been decided by a final order that had become non-appealable. (See R. 15470; R. 15618-
15629). 
During the many years in which the FLDS Intervenors failed to participate in this 
action, much transpired that caused non-FLDS members and FLDS members alike to rely 
upon the trial court's administration, the authority of the trial court's Special Fiduciary, 
and the final reformation of the Trust in October, 2006. For example, the trial court's 
orders delegated the Special Fiduciary authority to manage and lease trust property. (See, 
e.g., R. 1996-2001). Over the years preceding the FLDS Intervenors' May, 2009, 
motions to intervene, the Special Fiduciary reported entering into leases and occupancy 
agreements and selling some trust property, and he incurred substantial debts on behalf of 
the Trust in pursuing claims for return of trust property, in defending the Trust from tort 
claims, in representing the Trust in other lawsuits, and in pursuing water and subdivision 
issues for the benefit of the trust. (See, e.g., R. 4308-4423; R. 4424-4759; R. 6858-7230; 
R. 7805-7975; R. 10585-10891; R. 11145-11590) The parties also devoted substantial 
resources to creation of a process by which reformation could occur, to briefing the legal 
issues involved in reformation, and to crafting the proposed reformed declaration of trust. 
(See, e.g., R. 1122-1182; R. R. 1544-1602; R. 2104-2118; R. 2151-2157; R. 2422-2439; 
R. 3452-3480; R. 393-3992; R. 4009-4017; R. 4031-4069; R. 4100-4102; R. 5325-5473; 
6537-6545). As a result, a substantial number of people and families are residing upon 
and using Trust properties in reliance on the reformation and the authority delegated to 
the Special Fiduciary by the trial court. 
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By its Ruling and Order on Pending Motions filed July 16, 2009, the trial court 
denied the FLDS Intervenors' motions to intervene. (R. 16376-16380). The court 
adopted the analysis in Section II.a of the Arizona AG's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Movants' Motion to Stay Proceedings, To Replace Special Fiduciary, and to Enjoin 
Further Actions of Special Fiduciary Pending Evidentiary Hearing (see R. 15604-15617), 
holding that the FLDS Intervenors had not established the type of "legally cognizable 
interest" in property of the Trust needed to create an exception to the general rule that 
potential beneficiaries of a charitable trust have no standing to intervene in trust 
administration proceedings. (R. 16376-16380). 
Nevertheless, in denying the motions to intervene, the trial court ruled: 
That said, since the inception of this case the Court has agreed to consider 
comments from various non-parties, including interested potential 
beneficiaries; and has broadly noticed its hearings to anyone who is 
interested. Upon request, the Court has also been willing to include such 
individuals (or their counsel) in its distribution of Court decisions. Those 
actions by the Court should not be understood as anything more than what 
they are-a courtesy to interested individuals and as a way of ensuring that 
the Court receives relevant input on issues affecting the Trust. The Court 
remains committed to receiving input from non-parties in order for the 
Court to be fully and fairly informed on the issues it must decide. However, 
the Court's courtesies should not be misunderstood to imply that the Court 
recognizes those individuals as having standing in the case. 
(Id. [R. 16376]) The trial court then implemented its position on input from non-parties 
by allowing the FLDS Intervenors to participate in a hearing held July 29, 2009 on 
approval of a sale of the Berry Knoll Farm property. (R. 16415-16416; R. 16448 
[transcript of hearing of July 29, 2009]). The FLDS Intervenors were allowed to 
participate equally with all other parties in this hearing by presenting statements from 
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witnesses and arguments from their counsel. (See R. 16448 (transcript of hearing of 
July 29, 2009). At the hearing, the trial court stated: 
. . . I would ask the FLDS members who are here to take this 
word to those who are outside, I know it's a sacrifice to be 
here, I know that it was hard to come up. I needed to hear 
your viewpoints . . . that's why it was important to have 
people to speak on behalf and represent the views of the 
community and I want to thank you for being here. I wanted 
to thank you for engaging with me because I haven't had that. 
It wasn't until last fall that I even had a couple of members of 
the community in terms of Mr. Jessop and I think one other 
who showed up. Before that, for four years I have been 
begging to have the community respond and participate. 
(Id. [transcript of hearing of July 29, 2009] at p. 105). The FLDS Intervenors thus had 
as much say in the Berry Knoll Farm sale discussion as any of the parties. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The FLDS Intervenors claim entitlement to intervention as a matter of right. Such 
intervention is only allowed under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a) if the movants first prove that 
either: 1) a statute confers on them an unconditional right to intervene; or 2) they have an 
interest relating to the property in issue that may be impaired or impeded by disposition 
of the action, and that the interest is not already adequately represented by a party to the 
action. The only statute the FLDS Intervenors rely on is Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3). 
That statute confers no unconditional right to intervene here, however, as it applies only 
to "settlors" of the trust or "others" defined by common law standards the FLDS 
Intervenors do not meet. None of the FLDS Intervenors were settlors of the Trust, nor 
did they show the type of "special interest" that would justify standing to intervene. 
Also, the statute contemplates only actions "to enforce" a charitable trust. The FLDS 
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Intervenors seek to disrupt and to reverse the final reformation of the Trust, not to enforce 
the current trust. Thus, the statute does not apply to their motions. 
For similar reasons, the FLDS Intervenors did not show that they actually possess 
a legal interest relating to property of the Trust sufficient to create a right to intervention 
under the second alternative to Rule 24(a). The Trust as established at the time the 
motions to intervene were filed is a non-sectarian, charitable trust. Thus, the FLDS 
Intervenors' purported religious interests create no special interest. Nor does the Trust, 
or even the 1998 Trust, express a special fixed interest for individual FLDS Intervenors 
sufficient to confer standing on them to enforce any trust provisions. They are similarly 
situated to the thousands of other residents of the Colorado City and Hildale 
communities, FLDS and non-FLDS alike, who may qualify as trust participants by their 
prior contributions to building up the Trust. Such general interests do not create rights 
warranting intervention. 
The FLDS Intervenors' motions were also untimely. They seek an entrance to 
challenge the reformation of the Trust and upset all aspects of the current administration. 
However, such relief is not legally available to them, and the FLDS Intervenors waited 
far too long to seek intervention for such purposes. Their delay also works a substantial 
prejudice on those who have relied on the trial court's authorities under the trust 
administration proceedings, upon the Special Fiduciary's delegated powers, and upon the 
reformation of the Trust to a non-sectarian entity that does not favor one religion over 
another. 
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Finally, the trial court granted the FLDS Intervenors the equivalent of intervention 
by allowing them to be heard through argument of counsel, to brief issues, and to present 
witness statements in objection to the proposed sale of Berry Knoll Farm. The denial of 
a motion to intervene is not error when the trial court allows such participation. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. The Motions Show No Sufficient Legally Protectable Interest is at Stake. 
An intervenor must show that the law "vest[s] in him a protectable interest . . ." 
that is threatened by the ongoing proceedings. In re I.K., 220 P.3d 464, 472 (Utah 2009). 
The intervenor must establish a "direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation such 
that [his or her] rights may be affected, for good or for ill . . .." Id. (parenthetical in 
original). The FLDS Intervenors provided no proof of such a direct, protectable interest 
under either of the two Rule 24(a) alternatives for establishing a sufficient interest. 
A. No Statute Confers a Right to Intervene. 
The first alternative for showing the required "interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation" needed to support Rule 24(a) intervention requires that the moving party prove 
that a "statute confers an unconditional right to intervene" on them. Utah R. Civ. P. 
24(a). The FLDS Intervenors cannot make that showing. 
They claim that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) confers an unconditional right to 
intervene. That statute provides that "[t]he settlor of a charitable trust, among others, 
may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3). This 
statute does not apply for several reasons. 
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1. The FLDS Intervenors Are Not Seeking to Enforce the Trust, 
But Seek Instead an Improper Collateral Attack on the 
Reformation of the Trust. 
First, the FLDS Intervenors are not trying to "maintain a proceeding to enforce the 
trust" as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3). Instead, they claim that the 
trial court erred in ever reforming the Trust, and they seek to enforce interests that 
allegedly emanate from religious components of the superseded 1998 Trust. {See Petition 
for Extraordinary Writ in Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 20090859, at 2-3). For 
instance, FLDS Intervenors Lyle Jeffs and James Oler complain that the reformation has 
prevented them from performing their purported religious responsibilities to distribute 
properties of the Trust. (R. 15257-15263, at *{ 5; R. 15249-15256, at fflf 5, 8). Mr. Oler 
complains that "the Courts' reformation of the UEP Trust supplanted my role in the 
operation of the Trust under the Law of Consecration" because the reformation "vested 
primary responsibility for the distribution of Trust assets in the Special Fiduciary." (R. 
15257-15263, at ^ 5). Lyle Jeffs makes similar complaints. (R. 15249-15256, at Tf 5). 
Despite these complaints, the prior trust does not exist in any legal sense, and it 
cannot be enforced. The law of trusts confirms that once the trial court uses its cy pres 
powers to reform a trust, the reformed trust instrument supersedes the prior instrument 
and nobody can revive or enforce the prior instrument. See The Township of 
Cinnaminson v. First Camden Nat'I Bank and Trust Co., 238 A.2d 701, 708-09 (N. J. 
Super. 1968); 14 C.J.S. Charities, § 45. To allow the original intent of a settlor to be 
revived years after a court reforms a trust through its cy pres powers would unwisely 
open challenges to reformations "ad infinitum." The Township of Cinnaminson, 238 
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A.2d at 708-09. This, in turn, would improperly limit the social benefit derived from cy 
pres reformations because the new beneficiaries would be merely conditional recipients, 
unable to rely on their ability to make full use of the trust. Id. Thus, the courts may not 
reverse the reformation creating the current non-sectarian version of the Trust. 
Additionally, because the trust reformation was finalized by a final, appealable 
order of the trial court in October, 2006, the reformation is now a final order that is non-
appealable. See Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P. (requiring notice of appeal to be filed within 
30 days of entry of a final order or judgment); see also Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth, 13 
P.3d 616, 618 (Utah 2000) (holding that if an appeal is not timely filed, the appellate 
courts lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Larnoreaux, 767 
P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding appellate courts have jurisdiction only to 
dismiss an untimely appeal). 
The FLDS Intervenors have no way legally to overturn the prior reformation and 
seek resurrection of the 1998 Trust. Still, they have shown through all their filings that 
this is their ultimate intent in seeking to participate in these proceedings. Because the 
FLDS Intervenors seek to destroy, not enforce, the trust instrument now legally in effect, 
the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) do not apply. The statute supplies no right to 
intervene. 
An intervenor has no right to demand that the court in whose proceeding he intervenes 
reassess decisions made before he attempted to intervene. Suites at New Orleans, L.L.C. 
v. Lloyd's London, 13 So. 3d 241, 243 (La. App. 2009) (holding that intervenor "must 
take the suit as he finds it. He cannot complain of the mode of procedure or object to the 
jurisdiction of the court or retard the principal suit.") 
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2. The FLDS Intervenors Are Not Settlors of the Trust 
Moreover, the statute refers specifically only to proceedings brought by the 
"settlor" of the charitable trust "among others." As the Trust was reformed using the trial 
court's cypres powers, there is no individual settlor of the trust presently in force. Even 
if one assumed the 1998 Trust could still be enforced, the settlors of that Trust have all 
died. (SeeR. 16831-16869). The FLDS Intervenors cannot invoke the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) as settlors. 
3. The FLDS Intervenors Are Not the "Others" Contemplated by 
the Charitable Trust Enforcement Statute. 
This leaves the FLDS Intervenors arguing that the statute also contemplates 
proceedings brought by "others," and that they are the "others" it refers to. This 
argument fails because, even if they were the "others" contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-405(3), they would still have to show that they were intervening to "enforce" the 
current Trust. As explained above, they are not. 
Moreover, the "others" contemplated by the trust statute include the Attorney 
General, but not the FLDS Intervenors. The statute is ambiguous on what "others" it is 
referring to. The term "others" is nowhere defined in the trust statutes. However, the 
statute the FLDS Intervenors cite is drawn from the Uniform Trust Code (2000), whose 
comments recognize that under the general law of trusts, certain "special interests" may 
confer standing on potential charitable trust beneficiaries to judicially enforce the trust. 
See Uniform Trust Code, §§ 405(c) & cmt. ("The grant of standing to the settlor does not 
negate the right of . . . persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or their 
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interests"), 1001 cmt. ("In the case of a charitable trust, those with standing include . . . 
other persons with a special interest.") The code reference to "others" therefore ties to 
the long-established common law rules regarding which persons may seek to intervene in 
enforcement of a charitable trust. Those rules are expressly incorporated as a supplement 
to the Utah trust statutes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-7-106 ("The common law of trusts 
and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except to the extent modified by this 
chapter or laws of this state."), 75-1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions 
of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions.") The Court 
must therefore define which "others" may be entitled to seek to enforce a charitable trust 
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3) by reference to the common law governing such 
rights. 
Under the common law of trusts, those like the FLDS Intervenors have no 
standing to intervene in a trust administration proceeding. 
A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by 
the Attorney General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a 
person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, 
but not by persons who have no special interest or by the settlor or his 
heirs, personal representatives or next of kin. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 391; see also Collier v. Bd. of Nat'I. Missions of the 
Presbyterian Church, 464 P.2d 1015, 1018 (App. 1970). The rules governing the right to 
sue to enforce a charitable trust apply equally to deciding who has the right to intervene 
in an enforcement action brought by the Attorney General. See The Art Institute of 
Chicago v. Castle, 133 N.E.2d 748, 751 (111. App. 1956) (holding that rules governing 
standing for institution of original suits against trust apply as well to determining rights to 
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intervene). Thus, while the Attorney General has standing to enforce the Trust here, the 
FLDS Intervenors have no similar right to intervene unless they can show a sufficient 
"special interest." 
"[T]he term 'special interest' is not defined and must be determined on the facts of 
each case . . .." Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc., 208 Ariz. 176, 
182-83, 91 P.3d 1019, 1025-26 (App. 2004). Merely being potential beneficiaries or 
participants in benefits available through the Trust does not create a sufficient "special 
interest." "The mere fact that a person is a possible beneficiary is not sufficient to entitle 
him to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust." Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, § 391, cmt. c; see also 15 Am. Jur. 2d, Charities, § 142 ("[T[hose who enjoy the 
status of beneficiaries only when selected by the trustees generally are held to have no 
right to initiate a suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust."). 
The Arizona AG did not have the opportunity to test the FLDS Intervenors' claims 
that they have consecrated property to the Trust, but if they did, they may qualify as 
potential participants in benefits under the reformed Trust. (See R. 6537, at Sec. 4.2 
[Appendix "2" hereto]).3 This alone does not confer on them standing to enforce the 
Trust, however. 
Instead, to prove the type of "special interest" that can confer standing, a potential 
beneficiary "must be entitled to benefits under the trust that are greater than or different 
from those to which members of the public are entitled generally." Scott and Ascher on 
The Court's record indicates that the final form of the reformed trust is missing. The 
Arizona AG has attached a copy as Appendix "B" hereto for the Court's convenience and 
moves that it be added to the official record. 
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Trusts, vol. 5 § 37.3.10 (5 ed. 2008). Also, the special interests must emanate from the 
trust instrument itself, and must place the potential beneficiary in a small class of 
particularly identified persons who have particularized, identifiable and fixed rights to 
benefit from the trust. See Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 1825 91 P.3d at 
1025; see also, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 391, cmt. c. The Arizona Court of 
Appeals has adopted the commentary from George Gleason Bogert, The Law of Trusts 
and Trustees § 414 (Rev. 2d ed. Supp 2003) to explain: 
[I]n a fairly large group of cases the courts have permitted private 
individuals, whose positions with regard to the charitable trust were more 
or less fixed, to sue for its enforcement. These decisions have been 
regarded in the past as exceptional and dependent in large part on special 
circumstances showing that the plaintiff was certain to receive trust 
benefits, or on lack of opposition to the capacity of the complainant. 
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 182, 91 P.3d at 1025 (emphasis added). 
Courts place such strict limitations on what qualifies as "special interests" to avoid 
the multiplicity of litigation encouraged by anything other than a narrow exception. "The 
policy behind limiting enforcement of charitable trusts to public officers and persons with 
a special interest 'stems from the inherent impossibility of establishing a distinct 
justiciable interest on the part of a member of a large and constantly shifting benefited 
class, and the recurring burdens on the trust res and trustee of vexatious litigation that 
would result from recognition of a cause of action by any and all of a large number of 
individuals who might benefit incidentally from the trust.'" Id. (quoting Hooker v. Edes 
Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C.App. 1990); citing Bogert, § 414 ['The court usually 
require that suits for enforcement be brought by the established representative of the 
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charity, the Attorney General, so that the trustees may not be vexed by frequent suits, 
possible based on an inadequate investigate and brought by responsible parties, and so 
that the courts may not find their calendars clogged with an unnecessarily large amount 
of litigation."]; Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in 
the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F.L.Rev. 37, 41-47 (Fall 1993) [the "Blasko Article"]). 
The Illinois Court of Appeals has similarly warned against "[t]he vexation, delay and 
expense caused by attempts of individuals to intervene in pending suits to enforce or 
construe charitable trusts . . ." as justification for denying intervention to those without a 
sufficient special interest. The Art Institute of Chicago, 133 N.E.2d at 751. Thus, 
defining what qualifies as a sufficient "special interest" depends, at least in part, on the 
risk that allowing the claimed interest to confer standing creates for multiplying 
litigation. 
To enforce the policies behind limiting which interests qualify as sufficiently 
"special," the Arizona courts have adopted a helpful five-part test to determine if "special 
interests" exist. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 183, 91 P.3d at 1026. 
The test considers: 
(1) the nature of the benefited class and its relationship to the 
charity; (2) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of 
and the remedy sought; (3) the sate attorney general's 
availability or effectiveness to enforce the trust; (4) the 
presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the defendants; 
and (5) subjective and case-specific circumstances. 
A recent decision by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona arising 
out of these same United Effort Plan Trust proceedings confirms that these factors 
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compel the courts to reject claims by FLDS members that they have the "special 
interests" needed to support standing to intervene. Cooke v. Wisan, 2010 WL 1641015 
(D.Ariz. April 22, 2010). 
In Cooke, the plaintiff asserted that the Special Fiduciary, Mr. Wisan, "confiscated 
the homes and property of 20,000 to 70,000 people in Utah, Arizona and Canada in 
violation of the [federal] Takings Clause," and further challenged whether the Third 
Judicial District Court had jurisdiction over any of the United Effort Plan Trust's 
property in Arizona and Canada. Id. at * 1. The court ruled that the plaintiff had not 
established Article III standing and did "not have standing to allege injuries on behalf of 
20,000 to 70,000 unnamed people." Id. at *3. The court further concluded that the 
plaintiff failed to show the types of "special interests" needed to challenge the 
administration of this charitable trust. Id. at M n. 5. Relying on Robert Schalkenbach 
Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 183, 91 P.3d at 1026, the court explained: 
Very little weight is given to the nature of the acts complained of and 
allegations of fraud because "if mere allegations of grave misconduct were 
sufficient to confer standing, the purposes of limiting standing to protect 
trustees from vexatious litigation would be undermined. Where there are 
such allegations, . . . the availability of Attorney General enforcement will 
suffice to remedy any alleged misconduct." 
Id. (quoting Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 183 n. 7, 91 P.3d at 1026 n. 
7). The allegations here are closely tied to those faced in Cooke, and the same reasoning 
applied there applies here to reject any claims of "special interests." 
Moreover, even if this Court applies the five relevant factors independently, the 
FLDS Intervenors have not established any "special interests" justifying intervention. 
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B. Factor 1 - The Nature of the Class Interests Asserted by the FLDS 
Intervenors. 
1. The Class is Not Small and Recognizing Special Interests 
Threatens to Multiply Litigation Against a Resource-Starved 
Trust. 
To create "special interests", the class benefited by the trust must be a "small, 
sharply defined class," which is tested by the "manageability of the size of the class, 
whether it can be easily entered, and whether the [intervenor] established that it has a 
direct interest in the operation of the trust." Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, 
at 183-84, 91 P.3d at 1026-27. The class must be "small and distinct enough to prevent 
the trustees from being subjected to 'recurring vexatious litigation.'" Id. (citing Hooker, 
579 A.2d at 612; Kania v. Chatham, 254 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1979); Williams v. Board 
of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901, 909 (D.C. App. 1991); 
Pollock v. Peterson, 111 A.2d 45, 49 (Del. Ch. 1970); Warren v. Board of Regents, 544 
S.E.2d 190, 194 (Ga. 2001)). The Court should not allow "potential beneficiaries to clog 
court dockets and dissipate trust assets with attacks on ordinary exercises of trustees' 
judgment." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 615. Recognizing special interests in the FLDS 
Intervenors here will only encourage substantial additional litigation. 
The FLDS Intervenors claim that they represent the interests of several thousand 
FLDS members.4 {See Appellants' Brief at 28). Add to this the many non-FLDS 
4
 As the trial court noted in its November 10, 2008 Minute Entry and Order, this is not 
a class action proceeding, and the FLDS Intervenors do not by seeking intervention 
represent anyone but themselves. (R. 14063, n. 1). Nor have the FLDS Intervenors 
submitted admissible proof that they actually represent the specific interests of anyone 
else. Finally, given the indications in the record here {see R. 16448 (transcript of July 29, 
24 
potential trust participants whose existence is proven by the Jeffs and Holm decisions, 
and the FLDS Intervenors inhabit a class of potential beneficiaries that includes 
thousands of people whose identities are left unknown to this Court and the trial court. 
These FLDS Intervenors have proven particularly litigious. Between them, they have 
filed Since August, 2008 an Emergency Motion to Stay the Sale of Property (R. 13193-
13195), two Motions to Intervene (R. 15229-15232 and R. 15283-15287), a Motion to 
Stay Proceedings (R. 13965-13968), a Motion to Replace the Special Fiduciary (R. 
14582-14584), a Motion to Enjoin Further Actions of the Fiduciary Pending Evidentiary 
Hearing (R. 15324-15328), and a Motion for Expedited Discovery (R. 14582-14584), 
along with a separate action on behalf of members of the FLDS Church in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah and an action before the Superior Court of the State 
of Arizona in Mohave County. {See R. 14707-14715 [listing other pending actions]). 
Thus, if the FLDS Intervenors can establish "special interests" through their 
allegations of prior consecrations to the Trust, then so can thousands of others who might 
repeat the multi-jurisdictional, serial filing tactics experienced here. This is particularly 
dangerous given the Trust's precarious financial position. Just the costs of administration 
2009 hearing) at pp. 18-20, 23, 44-46, 77-80), and in the facts presented in Jeffs and 
United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm, 209 Ariz. 347, 101 P.3d 41 (App. 2004), and the terms 
of the 1998 Trust instrument (R. 23-24, at Section II ["[Trust] Participants who, in the 
opinion of the Presidency of the Church, do not honor their commitments to live their 
lives according to the principles of the United Effort Plan and the Church shall remove 
themselves from the Trust property and, if they do not, the Board of Trustees may in its 
discretion cause their removal"]), those who consider themselves FLDS Church members 
today may not be members tomorrow through the decision of others. Thus, the FLDS 
Intervenors cannot say with confidence that they know they are representing the current 
and future interests of all persons now professing membership in the FLDS Church. 
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so far have placed the Trust over $2 million in debt and required the sale of Trust assets 
to cover costs. (See Appellants' Brief at 14-15). Recognizing a sufficient special interest 
here threatens to open the door to thousands of others who may wish at some point to 
protest the administration of the Trust, realizing that the Trust is financially powerless to 
fight back. This risk counsels against finding any "special interests" in the FLDS 
Intervenors. 
C. The Extraordinary Nature of the Acts Alleged by the Intervenors. 
A second important factor in assessing if "special interests" exist is whether the 
issues targeted by the intervenors threaten the ongoing administration of the trust, or 
whether they are simply claiming the trust has taken an extraordinary action impacting 
their particularized interests. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 184-85, 91 
P.3d at 1027-28. Moreover, the challenge to the trustee's actions must attack a 
fundamental trust issue and not challenge the trustee's normal exercise of discretion. 
Hooker, 579 A.2d at 612-16. 
1. The Intervenors Seek to Target All Aspects of Ongoing Trust 
Administration. 
Where the intervenors allege, as here, that the Trust assets are being mismanaged, 
improperly transferred or used, and that the trust managers should be stopped or replaced, 
they seek remedies that "wish[] to influence the daily operations of the [trust]." Robert 
Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 184-85, 91 P.3d at 1027-28. Intervenors seeking 
remedies that "are highly intrusive in the administration of the trust" improperly open the 
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trust "to further litigation by other potential or disappointed beneficiaries." Id. at 185, 91 
P.3d at 1028. The Court should not recognize special interests in them. See id. 
Here, the FLDS Intervenors have sought by Petition for Extraordinary Writ to this 
Court to invalidate the reformation of the Trust, and they have tried to stop and remove 
the Special Fiduciary from his delegated trust administration duties. (Supreme Court of 
Utah Case No. 2009-0859; R. 14582-14584). They now claim that the Special Fiduciary 
has engaged in fraud on the court and criminal activities. (Appellants' Brief at 13-14). 
All these allegations are intended to motivate removal of the Special Fiduciary who they 
dislike and distrust, and to replace him with trust administrators who will impose a 
religious test on who receives trust benefits that is satisfactory to the intervenors. This 
hits at the heart of trust administration, and opens the door to other frustrated potential 
beneficiaries, including those who are non-FLDS and might prefer that FLDS members 
not be eligible for benefits. Again, the allegations made by the FLDS Intervenors and the 
relief they seek counsels against acknowledging any that they have any "special 
interests." 
Moreover, the motions to intervene targeted the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll 
Farm. The sale of one piece of trust property to raise cash needed to satisfy trust debts is 
a normal trust operation taken in the discretion of the trustee (or, as here, a special 
fiduciary). It is not a "fundamental" trust issue that supports finding "special interests." 
D. The Attorney General's Actions. 
Where "the Attorney General's Office would be able to enforce the trust if it 
concluded that Arizona [or Utah] citizens were being harmed by the [trust's] alleged 
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breach/' the courts should be reluctant to find "special interests" in members of the 
public. Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 185, 91 P.3d at 1028; see also 
Cooke, 2010 WL 1641015 at *3. Here, the case has attracted the involvement of not one, 
but two Attorney General's offices. Also, the record shows that the Attorneys General 
have not always advocated the same positions. {See R. 16201-16217). This shows that 
the interest of Arizona and Utah citizens are being affirmatively and independently 
represented by the advocacy of the Attorneys General of their states. Again, it is not 
necessary to recognize any "special interest" to protect those with a potential interest in 
trust benefits. 
E. Claims of Fraud by the Special Fiduciary. 
The FLDS Intervenors claimed below that the Special Fiduciary was harming the 
FLDS members by placing non-FLDS members into housing on Trust property, which 
ostensibly prevented the FLDS Bishops from granting housing requests from their 
followers. (CITE TO RECORD). However, they provided no proof that the Special 
Fiduciary has refused housing requests for fraudulent reasons. The trial court has pointed 
out that there exists a formal process for seeking benefits from the Trust, and that the 
FLDS are just as able to invoke that process as anyone else. (See R. 16448 [transcript of 
July 29, 2009 hearing] at pp. 108-109). 
The only claim of fraud the FLDS Intervenors make alleges that the Special 
Fiduciary committed fraud on a court in obtaining an $8.8 million default judgment 
against the former trustees of the Trust. (Appellants' Brief at 13-14). Ironically, this 
asserts a fraud in favor of the Trust, allegedly securing more assets for the Trust than it is 
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entitled to. (See id. at 14 "[t]he judgment allowed the Fiduciary subsequently to execute 
on additional valuable property that has never been in the Trust . . ,.") The FLDS 
Intervenors' real complaint about the default judgment is that it is being used to "divert 
resources . . . away from the FLDS community . . .." (Id.) Though the FLDS adherents 
may have reason to question the failure of the former trustees to defend the Special 
Fiduciary's claims against them, they have not shown any sort of fraud draining the trust. 
Finally, the FLDS Intervenors challenge alleged criminal activity by the Special 
Fiduciary, citing one misdemeanor trespassing conviction of a representative of the 
Special Fiduciary and a second set of similar charges leveled at the Special Fiduciary 
himself for his conspiracy in allowing such alleged trespassing on property of the Trust 
occupied by FLDS members. The FLDS Intervenors have not shared with the Court the 
prior frustrations faced by the Special Fiduciary in seeking cooperation of local municipal 
law enforcement to uphold the order and authority of the Utah court, and the fact that this 
lack of cooperation resulted in an administrative finding during a decertification 
proceeding for the Marshal overseeing Colorado City and Hildale that the Marshal's 
refusal to answer certain questions at a deposition by the Special Fiduciary's counsel 
"constitutes nonfeasance in office," "tended to disrupt, diminish, and jeopardize public 
trust in the law enforcement profession, because his answers made clear he was more 
concerned with protecting members of the FLDS than he was with enforcing a valid court 
order," and therefore provided grounds for the Arizona Peace Officers Standards and 
Training Board to revoke, suspend, cancel, or otherwise sanction his Arizona peace 
officer's certification. (See Emergency Report of the Arizona Attorney General's Office 
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and Recommendation for Expedited Status Conference filed below on July 8, 2010, at 
Exhibit "10" at 66, fflf 24-26). The reference to misdemeanor charges asserted by local 
municipal authorities under these circumstances does not prove any misconduct 
undermining the Trust. Moreover, it demonstrates that the local FLDS adherents already 
have an active law enforcement advocate against any alleged illegal encroachments on 
their privacy by the Trust or its agents. 
F. Other Case-Specific Circumstances. 
1. The FLDS Intervenors Have Shown No Fixed Rights to Receive 
Trust Benefits. 
As noted above, sufficient "special interests" require a showing "'that the plaintiff 
was certain to receive trust benefits.'" Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 
182, 91 P.3d at 1025 (quoting Bogert, § 414). The FLDS Intervenors established no 
fixed right to receive benefits under the 1998 Trust, and have established no fixed rights 
to receive benefits under the Trust as reformed. 
Instead, even the 1998 Trust left distribution of benefits to discretion of the 
trustees: 
1) that "[t]he Board of Trustees, in their sole discretion, 
shall administer the Trust consistent with its religious purpose 
to provide for Church members according to their wants and 
needs, insofar as their wants are just. . .;" 
2) that "[t]he privilege to participate in the United Effort 
Plan and live upon the lands and in the buildings of the 
United effort Plan Trust is granted, and may be revoked, by 
the Board of Trustees;" and 
3) that "[participation in the United Effort Plan and use 
of property owned by the United Effort Plan Trust is not and 
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does not become a right or claim of anyone who may benefit 
in any way from the Trust." 
(See R. 23). Thus, the FLDS Intervenors had no specified, fixed rights to receive any 
benefits even under the now defunct 1998 Trust. The same applies to the reformed Trust. 
It provides that trust benefits shall be distributed on a discretionary basis after giving 
consideration to multiple factors. (R. 6537 [Appendix "2" hereto]). It does not prefer 
any particular potential participant over any other, and certainly does not single out any 
of the FLDS Intervenors from the thousands of potential trust participants for favored 
treatment. The FLDS Intervenors cannot show the type of fixed and particularized right 
that might entitle them to claim "special interests." 
Moreover, the FLDS Intervenors do not even claim any truly fixed right under any 
trust instrument. Intervenors Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and Merlin Jessop claim only 
that unnamed religious leaders granted them ill-defined stewardships to use unspecified 
portions of the Berry Knoll Farm property. Intervenors James Oler's and Lyle Jeffs' 
affidavits confirm that the purported stewardships involve "no formal conveyance," but 
simply the giving of permission by religious leaders, who may or may not be trustees of 
the Trust, to use some portion of Trust property. The discretionary decisions of religious 
leaders who may not even be legally empowered to make any distributions of trust 
properties does not equate to a fixed right under a trust instrument to use or enjoy any 
trust property. 
The claims of FLDS Intervenors James Oler and Lyle Jeffs are even further 
removed from the trust instruments. They claim an interest in administering the trust and 
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distributing trust property as a function of their positions as FLDS Bishops. {See R. 
15249-15256, at ffi[ 5, 8, 9; R. 15257-15263, at ffif 5, 8, 10). However, the instruments 
governing the Original Trust, the 1998 Trust and the current reformed Trust all grant 
exclusive authority to distribute trust property benefits to the actual trustees. (R. 31, at f 
V ["The trustees . . . and their successors in trust shall hold the legal title to all property 
that may be acquired by or for the benefit of the trust estate, and shall have and exercise 
exclusive management, disposition and control of the same . . .."; R. 23, at \ III [". . . the 
Trust shall be administered by a Board of Trustees . . ." who "shall have all rights, 
powers, and privileges of an absolute owner in carrying out the purposes of the Trust, 
including without limitation all powers of trustees under Utah law."]; Appendix "2" 
hereto).5 The record confirms that neither Jeffs nor Oler were trustees of the 1998 Trust 
when this administration proceeding started. {See R. 1-5 [naming the trustees of the 1998 
Trust]).6 They do not claim that they were ever trustees, nor delegates of the trustees, 
and they certainly have not been appointed trustees since this administration proceeding 
commenced. Thus, they have no legally viable authority to administer the Trust or 
The 1998 Trust provided at Section III that the Board of Trustees, subject to 
approval of the President of the Church, "may designate representatives" to perform 
functions on behalf of the board. (R. 24). However, none of the FLDS Intervenors 
provided any proof that the prior trustees had delegated trust powers to them. And, even 
if they had, such delegation would have emanated from the powers of the prior trustees 
which did not survive the reformation of the Trust. 
The trustees of the 1998 Trust at the time this action commenced were Truman 
Barlow, Warren Jeffs, Leroy Jeffs, Winston Blackmore, James Zitting and William E. 
Jessop a/k/a William E. Timpson. {Id.) 
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distribute its property, and they have no special interest or fixed right created or 
recognized in any of the trust instruments. 
Finally, the religious positions of Messrs. Jeffs and Oler as "bishops" of the FLDS 
Church do not change the analysis. Even if the 1998 Trust was still operative, it did not 
provide anyone special rights to receive trust benefits simply because they were officials 
of the FLDS Church. (R. 21-27). Moreover, any trust objective to advance a particular 
religion or tie trust benefits to religious practice ended when the trial court reformed the 
trust without objection or appeal in October, 2006. Even if the FLDS Bishops, Oler and 
Jeffs, had been able to establish any legal rights under the 1998 Trust, they are, post-
reformation, no better off than the unsuccessful intervenor in Robert Schalkenbach 
Foundation, 208 Ariz, at 184, 91 P.3d at 1027 who was once a beneficiary but had ceased 
being one ten years earlier. They might qualify, at most, as "just another potential 
beneficiary of the trust."7 Id. 
Given their inability to show any fixed and particularized interest emanating from 
the terms of the existing Trust instrument, or even any such interest emanating from the 
terms of the 1998 Trust and Original Trust instruments, the FLDS Intervenors cannot 
show sufficient "special interests" to qualify as the "others" who might seek enforcement 
of the Trust under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-405(3). 
Even this status would require the Bishops to have contributed sufficiently to the 
building up of the Trust to be qualified as potential trust participants. (See Appendix "2" 
hereto at Sec. 4.2). 
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2. The FLDS Intervenors Seek Only to Vindicate Personal 
Interests. 
"[S]uits by a representative of a class of potential beneficiaries should aim to 
vindicate the interests of the entire class and should be addressed to trustee action that 
impairs those interests, not the interests of a given individual." Hooker, 579 A.2d at 615. 
The FLDS Intervenors' motions places their personal interests over those of all other 
potential Trust participants. For instance, intervenors Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson and 
Merlin Jessop focus solely on the impact a proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm will 
have on their alleged religious stewardships. (Mot. to Stay 4, 12-13.) The two Bishops, 
intervenors Oler and Jeffs, seek to vindicate unique religious authority that allegedly 
entitles them to determine who gets distributions of property belonging to the Trust. 
They do not seek to vindicate the interests of all potential Trust participants which 
include non-FLDS members, and cannot even prove that they represent all FLDS Church 
members. 
G. The FLDS Intervenors Cannot Prove the Type of Interest That 
Justifies Intervention As of Right Under Rule 24(a) By Those Without 
a Statutory Right. 
Absent a statutory grant of an unconditional right to intervene, an individual "may 
intervene as of right only under the second alternative, which requires [him] to establish 
that: (1) [his] application to intervene was timely, (2) [he] has 'an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action,5 (3) [he] 'is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [his] ability to protect 
that interest,' and (4) [his] interest is not 'adequately represented by existing parties.'5' 
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Beacham v. Fritzi Realty Corp., 131 P.3d 271, 273 (Utah App. 2006) (quoting Utah R. 
Civ. P. 24(a)). The test for intervention under this aspect of Rule 24(a) parallels the test 
for intervention by a potential trust beneficiary under the common law of trusts. The 
movant must prove a "significantly protectable interest" in the subject of the litigation 
and not just a contingent interest or one that is similar to any other member of the public. 
See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 
(Wyo. 1994). 
For the same reasons that the FLDS Intervenors cannot prove a right to intervene 
under the Utah trust statutes, they cannot prove an interest sufficient at law to justify their 
intervention otherwise. The law of trusts, explored above, prevents them from proving 
the type of "special interest" that would grant standing to intervene. 
II. The Motions to Intervene Were Untimely. 8 
The intervention rule requires first that each application to intervene be "timely". 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a) ("Upon timely application anyone shall per permitted to intervene 
in an action . . . ") (emphasis added); see Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 11A P.2d 1130, 
1131 (Utah 1989) ("The first requirement under both rule 24(a) and rule 24(b) is that the 
intervenor make 'timely application.'") (quoting Jenner, 659 P.2d at 1073-74); Parduhn 
8
 The Court may deny this appeal based on such defects in the motions even if the trial 
court did not rely on them. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 
895 (Utah, 1988) (holding that "we may affirm trial court decisions on any proper 
ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling.") (citing 
City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1984); In re Estate of 
Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982); Rice, Melby Enter., Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
646 P.2d 696, 698 n. 3 (Utah 1982)). 
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v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 495, 500 (Utah 2005) (holding that Rule 24(a) requires that the 
moving party establish "that [] its motion to intervene is timely . . ..") (quoting Moreno v. 
Bd. ofEduc, 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996)). A "motion to intervene can be denied 
solely on the basis of timeliness." Masinter v. Markstein, 45 P.3d 237, 242 (Wyo. 2002) 
(citing Platte County School District No. 1 v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 638 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Wyo. 1982)). Thus, unless the motions to intervene were timely, a 
valid basis exists to reject the intervention attempt and uphold the trial court's ruling. 
Determining the timeliness of an application to intervene is a matter within the 
trial court's discretion. See Jenner, 659 P.2d at 1073-74 (""Use of the word 'timely' in 
the [r]ule requires that the timeliness of the application be determined under the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, and in the sound discretion of the court."); 
Masinter, 45 P.3d at 242 (citing Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 432 (Wyo. 1985)). 
Timeliness should thus be evaluated "in light of the circumstances of the particular case," 
Colley, 871 P.2d at 194, and any determination of timeliness should not be overturned on 
appeal unless an abuse of discretion exists. U. S. v. Louisiana., 669 F.2d 314, 315 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
Given that the Trust was reformed by final order in October, 2006, and that the 
reformation order is now non-appealable order, membership in the FLDS Church cannot, 
9
 The Court may deny this appeal solely based on such defects in the motions even if 
the trial court did not rely on them exclusively. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (holding that "we may affirm trial court 
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another reason 
for its ruling.") (citing City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 
1984); In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111,1114 (Utah 1982); Rice, Melby Enter., Inc. v. 
Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698 n. 3 (Utah 1982)). 
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legally, grant any person any unique interest in receiving benefits under the Trust. {See 
Appendix "2" hereto). Nor can any stewardships granted by FLDS religious leaders, 
which they admit did not constitute any formal conveyance of rights, survive the 
reformation of the Trust and delegation to the Special Fiduciary of the right to manage 
and lease trust property. The only way the FLDS Intervenors can claim some sort of 
"special interest,55 then, is to reverse the reformation. 
The prior filings of the FLDS Intervenors have attempted to reverse the 
reformation.10 On October 19, 2009, a group calling itself the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, using an affidavit from FLDS Intervenor Willie Jessop, 
filed with this Court a Petition for Extraordinary Writ in Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 
20090859. The Petition stated that "[t]he basis for this Petition . . . is that Respondent 
[Judge Lindberg] unlawfully 'reformed5 a religious charitable trust55 and asked this Court 
to stop "the course of action charted by the 'reformation555 and instead administer the 
"bulk of the remaining Trust assets55 in accordance with the language of 1998 Trust 
instrument. (Petition for Extraordinary Writ in Supreme Court of Utah Case No. 
20090859, at 1-3). Thus, the ultimate objective of those claiming association and 
leadership in the FLDS Church is to challenge and overturn the reformation of the Trust. 
Though the FLDS Intervenors5 motions to intervene were filed in connection with 
the Special Fiduciary's proposal to sell the Berry Knoll Farm, the same movants have 
sought by another filing to remove the Special Fiduciary and the trial court judge, Judge 
Lindberg. {See R. 14551-14578; R. 14582-14584). Their accusations against Judge 
Lindberg include allegations surrounding her formation of the Trust. {See id.). The 
portion of the motion seeking removal of the Special Fiduciary remains pending. 
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To the extent the FLDS Intervenors' motions for intervention seek to provide a 
platform by which the FLDS Intervenors can challenge the Trust's reformation and 
administrative actions that are consistent with that reformation, they were untimely. 
Where a judgment was entered long before the application to intervene was made, the 
motion is particularly subject to being barred as untimely. As this Court has explained: 
Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after entry 
of judgment. The courts are reluctant to make exceptions to the general rule 
[footnote omitted] and do so only upon a strong showing of entitlement and 
justification, [footnote omitted] or such unusual or compelling 
circumstances [footnote omitted] as will justify the failure to seek 
intervention earlier. Postjudgment intervention is looked upon with 
disfavor by reason of the tendency thereof to prejudice the rights of existing 
parties and the undue interference it has upon the orderly processes of the 
court, [footnote omitted] 
In Rains v. Lewis, [footnote omitted] the Washington court reaffirmed its 
holding in a prior case [footnote omitted] and stated the rule as follows: 
[I]f [intervention is] permitted after judgment, it should be 
only on a strong showing after taking into consideration all 
circumstances, including prior notice of the lawsuit and 
circumstances contributing to the delay in making the motion. 
To this we would add a showing of substantial prejudice if 
permission to intervene is denied. 
Jenner, 659 P.2d at 1074. Thus, where a partner had chosen to remain undisclosed, and 
had failed to seek intervention until 11 days after entry of summary judgment against the 
partnership venture, intervention was not allowed. 
Similarly, in Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 11A P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah, 1989) this 
Court noted that the relevant "facts and circumstances" reflected that the movant knew 
the case was pending before he tried to intervene, but that he failed to try to intervene 
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"until every fact necessary for a ruling on the motion for summary judgment had been 
deemed admitted and a ruling had been requested on the motion." The Court concluded 
that given the movant's "apparent notice and opportunity to intervene at an earlier stage 
of the proceeding and the ripeness of the case for summary judgment at the time the 
motion to intervene was made, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. Id. The Court further confirmed that individuals who were not parties at the 
time a dispositive ruling was entered below have no standing "to challenge on appeal the 
[trial] court's ruling . . ."Id. at 1131. 
Here the FLDS Intervenors delayed seeking intervention, without excuse, to the 
prejudice of the parties and others who have relied upon the administrative orders of the 
trial court, the authority of the Special Fiduciary, and the reformation of the Trust. FLDS 
Intervenor Willie Jessop has admitted that "[i]n 2005, we became aware that the Third 
District Court had determined that the Board of Trustees was in breach of the Trust and 
had removed the Board and appointed a Special Fiduciary to administer the Trust." (See 
Appendix "3" hereto at 7, f^ 26 [emphasis added]). The planned reformation of the Trust 
was appropriately noticed in advance, including through service on Rodney Parker as 
counsel for the Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints. Yet, the FLDS Intervenors failed to seek intervention then, and 
waited over two more years to seek intervention. In the meantime, the Trust leased 
properties to individuals, sold other properties with the trial court's approval, entered into 
contracts including a settlement of the two tort actions pending against the Trust, initiated 
other litigation to recover the Trust's assets and damages at considerable expense, 
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acquired property for the Trust like the Harker Farm and arranged for its management, 
and incurred debts to assess address water issues affecting the Trust's property and to 
complete engineering studies needed to seek subdivision of the Trust's properties through 
the local municipal governments. (See discussion and record citations, supra, at 11). 
Yet, all the while the FLDS Intervenors stood idly by and refused to participate. 
Then, with the Trust having incurred large debts that required the sale of Trust 
properties, the FLDS Intervenors sought to intervene and stop the Trust from selling 
property needed to pay the Trust's debts. The FLDS Church members have also sought 
to overturn the reformation of the Trust, and the FLDS Intervenors have sought to have 
the Special Fiduciary removed, and to have the appointed trial court judge removed. 
When asked why the FLDS waited so long to participate in the trust administration 
proceedings, their counsel previously indicated to this Court that they were honoring a 
religious test. Yet, by choosing to say that the religious test was sufficiently complete 
years after the Trust, parties and trial court had incurred so much on behalf of a Trust the 
FLDS leadership had abandoned, the FLDS Intervenors sought to intervene at a point of 
maximum possible disruption. The unexcused delay only enhances the prejudice of the 
attempted intervention to the parties, the Court, and to the many persons who have relied 
on the trust administration proceedings to lease, improve and work Trust property, to 
supply services to the Trust on the expectation of compensation, and to purchase trust 
property with the Court's approval These factors justify finding the attempted 
intervention untimely and thereby barred by Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
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III. The FLDS Intervenors Cannot Establish Prejudice Sufficient to Justify Broad 
Intervention. 
Despite its rulings on the FLDS Intervenors' motion to intervene, the trial court 
has allowed them to appear through counsel, file matters to be considered regarding 
settlement and regarding the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm, to present statements 
of witnesses, and to argue through counsel their positions on trust administration matters, 
including the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm, before the trial court. (See R. 
16448 [transcript of July 29, 2009 hearing]). Where this level of participation is allowed 
despite the denial of intervention, the interests of the party seeking intervention are 
adequately protected for due process purposes, and the refusal to formally grant 
intervention provides no basis for appeal. See S.E.C v. Charles Plohn & Co., 448 F.2d 
546, 549 (2nd Cir. 1971) (holding that nonparty served with notie of motion to sell, 
permitted to file papers, submit proof, and be heard on oral argument suffered no 
prejudice from denial of motion to intervene.); see also U.S. v. Hooker Chemicals & 
Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 992-93 (2nd Cir. 1984) (fact that nonparty's interests could 
have been nearly accommodated by accepting district court's offer of elevated amicus 
status with opportunity to present witnesses weighed in favor of not disturbing court's 
denial of motion to intervene.); S.E.C. v. Byers, 109 F.R.D. 299, 302 (W.D. Pa. 1985) 
(motion to intervene should be denied because nonparties can present objections at 
scheduled hearing); S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, LTD., 194 F.R.D. 457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (summary or claims proceedings are adequate to protect due process rights of 
nonparties seeking to safeguard assets without granting a motion to intervene.) 
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IV. Even if the FLDS Interveners Could Justify Intervention, The Court Would 
Have to Narrowly Limit the Intervention. 
The original parties to this action, not the FLDS Intervenors, would be prejudiced 
by allowing broad, late intervention. This Court has held that "upon a showing that the 
original parties would be prejudiced by a broad intervention, the court may limit the 
issues that an intervenor may litigate. See Wright & Miller § 1922." Taylor-West Weber 
Water Improvement Dist. v. Olds, 224 P.3d 709, 713 (Utah 2009); see also Reikes v. 
Martin, All So.2d 385, 391 (Miss. 1985) ("An intervenor . . . should not be permitted to 
do more to the prejudice of any party.") Such limitations are justified even where a party 
shows a right to intervene. Nielson v. Thompson, 982 P.2d 709, 713 (Wyo. 1999) ("even 
if an intervenor comes in a a matter of right, a district court may limit the role of the 
intervenor in the litigation.") Thus, even if the Court considered allowing intervention, it 
should be allowed, at most, to address future administration issues, and not to reverse all 
the work that has gone before while the FLDS Intervenors purposefully stood silent. 
V. The FLDS Intervenors Did Not File a Pleading as Required. 
Rule 24(c), Utah R. Civ. P. requires that any application to intervene be 
accompanied by a pleading. The FLDS Intervenors did not file any pleading with their 
motions. Thus, they failed to comply with Rule 24 and their motions should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the FLDS Intervenors cannot establish the type of special interest that 
would justify intervention to enforce a charitable trust, and because the FLDS 
Intervenors5 delay in seeking intervention renders their motions for intervention both 
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untimely and highly prejudicial to the parties, the trial court, and many non-parties who 
have relied on the trust administration proceeding, the Court should uphold the trial 
court's denial of the motions to intervene brought by Willie Jessop, Dan Johnson, Merlin 
Jessop, Lyle Jeffs and James Oler. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of July, 2010. 
Terry Goddard 
Attorney General 
William A. Richards 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys tor Appellees 
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Appendix 1 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map j Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: 
Utah Code 
Title 75 Utah Uniform Probate Code 
Chapter 1 General Provisions, Definitions, and Probate Jurisdiction of Court 
Section 302 Subject matter jurisdiction. 
75-1-302. Subject matter jurisdiction. 
(1) To the foil extent permitted by the Constitution of Utah, the court has jurisdiction over all subject 
matter relating to: 
(a) estates of decedents, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors of 
decedents, and estates of protected persons; 
(b) protection of minors and incapacitated persons; and 
(c) trusts. 
(2) The court has foil power to make orders, judgments, and decrees and take all other action 
necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it. 
Enacted by Chapter 150, 1975 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 75_01_030200.ZIP 1,775 Bytes 
« Previous Section (75-1-301) Next Section (75-1-303) » 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
Go TcJ 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution j House j Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: 
Utah Code 
Title 75 Utah Uniform Probate Code 
Chapter 7 Utah Uniform Trust Code 
Section 201 Court ~ Exclusive jurisdiction of trusts. 
75-7-201. Court — Exclusive jurisdiction of trusts. 
(1) (a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning 
the internal affairs of trusts. 
(b) Proceedings which may be maintained under this section are those concerning: 
(i) the administration and distribution of trusts; 
(ii) the declaration of rights; and 
(hi) the determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts. 
(c) These include, but are not limited to proceedings to: 
(i) appoint or remove a trustee; 
(ii) review a trustee's fees; 
(iii) review and settle interim or final accounts; 
(iv) ascertain beneficiaries; 
(v) determine any question arising in the administration or distribution of any trust, including 
questions of construction of trust instruments; 
(vi) instruct trustees; 
(vii) determine the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, duty, or right; and 
(viii) order transfer of administration of the trust to another state upon appropriate conditions as may 
be determined by the court or accept transfer of administration of a trust from another state to this state 
upon such conditions as may be imposed by the supervising court of the other state, unless the court in 
this state determines that these conditions are incompatible with its own rules and procedures. 
(2) (a) A proceeding under this section does not result in continuing supervision by the court over the 
administration of the trust. 
(b) The management and distribution of a trust estate, submission of accounts and reports to 
beneficiaries, payment of trustee's fees and other obligations of a trust, acceptance and change of 
trusteeship, and other aspects of the administration of a trust shall proceed expeditiously consistent with 
the terms of the trust, free of judicial intervention and without order, approval or other action of any 
court, subject to the jurisdiction of the court as invoked by interested parties or as otherwise exercised as 
provided by law. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2003 Special Session 2 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 75_07_020100.ZIP 2,642 Bytes 
« Previous Section (75-7-112) Next Section (75-7-202) » 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
Go To j 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
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Appendix 2 
REFORMED 
DECLARATION OF TRUST 
OF THE 
UNITED EFFORT PLAN TRUST 
This Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust is effective the AS** 
day of October, 2006. 
RECITALS 
A. The United Effort Plan Trust Agreement was originally executed effective 
November 9, 1942. On the 3rd day of November, 1998, the Amended and Restated Declaration 
of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust was executed, The 1998 Restatement amended in total 
and restated the 1942 Trust Agreement. 
B. The 1942 Trust Agreement and The 1998 Restatement were executed and the 
Agreement is executed for the purpose of establishing an irrevocable trust qualified as a 
charitable trust as the term is defined in the Utah Code and under applicable common law. 
C. Pursuant to a Memorandum Decision dated December 13, 2005 entered by the 
Honorable Denise Posse Lindberg, Judge of The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the 1998 Restatement was to be reformed. This Agreement is the 
Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust as directed by the Court. 
D. Assets were originally contributed to the Trust as described in the 1942 Trust 
Declaration and the 1998 Restatement. Additional assets have been contributed to the Trust in 
the Trust's name and the name of former trustees. All Trust Property, including subsequently 
acquired assets, shall be held, managed, and distributed in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement. 
E. This reformation of the Trust is guided by the following three principles: 
E. 1 The Trust is a charitable trust; the beneficiaries of the Trust are large in 
number and constitute a definite class, however the beneficiaries within 
that class are indefinite and the Trust Property shall be devoted to 
providing for the just wants and needs of the beneficiaries which purpose 
is beneficial to the community. 
E.2 The structure of the Trust shall not benefit, advocate or facilitate illegal 
practices including, but not limited to, polygamy, bigamy, or sexual 
activity between adults and minors. 
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E.3 The reformation and administration of the Trust shall be based on neutral 
principles of law; the reformation shall not be based on religious doctrine 
or practice and shall not attempt to resolve underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine. The reformation shall allow for ecclesiastical input of 
a non-binding nature and a mechanism - independent of priesthood input -
for establishing benefits under the Trust. 
AGREEMENT 
Therefore, pursuant to the Order of the Court, The Amended and Restated Declaration of 
Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust is reformed in its entirety to read as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 1.1 1942 Trust Agreement means The United Effort Plan Trust Agreement 
originally executed effective November 9,1942. 
Section 1.2 The 1998 Restatement means The Amended and Restated Declaration of 
Trust of The United Effort Plan Trust executed the 3rd day of November, 1998. 
Section 1.3 Agreement means this Reformed Declaration of Trust of The United Effort 
Plan Trust dated effective the day of October, 2006. 
Section 1.4 Annual Report shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.6.1(b). 
Section 1.5 Board means the Board of Trustees of the United Effort Plan Trust as 
determined in Article 5. Except as otherwise set forth herein, whenever the Board is authorized 
or required to take any action, such action shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of the 
Trustees as set forth in Section 5.1.8. 
Section 1.6 Conflicting Interest shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1-11(b). 
Section 1.7 Contribution or Contributions shall have the meaning set forth in Section 
3.2. 
Section 1,8 Corporate Fiduciary means an institutional Fiduciary appointed pursuant 
to this Agreement. Whenever a Corporate Fiduciary is appointed hereunder, the appointment 
shall refer to the Corporate Fiduciary as constituted at the time of the appointment and each 
successor entity to the corporation however succession may occur. Succession as used herein 
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shall include, but not be limited to, all forms of corporate reorganizations recognized by Section 
368 of the IRC Code. 
Section 1.9 Court means the Court having authority over Case No. 053900848 of The 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah or its successors. 
Section 1.10 Designated Recipients shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.8.1. 
Section 1.11 Disclosing Trustee shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.11 (a), 
Section 1,12 Electronic Communication shall have the meaning set forth in Section 
5.1.9(d). 
Section 1.13 Fiduciary means any person who has a fiduciary duty, as defined by statute 
or common law or pursuant to this Agreement to the Trust, any trust created hereunder or to a 
Trust Participant, including, but not limited to, Trustees. 
Section 1.14 FLDS Church means the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints. 
Section 1.15 Individual Fiduciary means an individual appointed as a Fiduciary 
pursuant to this Agreement. The appointment shall refer to the specified individual. Except as 
specifically set forth herein otherwise, the office of an Individual Fiduciary may not voluntarily 
or involuntarily be transferred by or to any other individual. 
Section 1.16 IRC Code means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended, or 
corresponding provisions of subsequent federal tax laws. When the Fiduciaries of the Trust are 
directed to act in accordance with the IRC Code, they should give appropriate weight to the 
Internal Revenue Service's regulations, revenue rulings and private letter rulings as well as court 
decisions interpreting the IRC Code. However, this direction shall not be interpreted to preclude 
the Fiduciaries from contesting the position of the Internal Revenue Service or any court as to the 
proper interpretation of a IRC Code Section provided such contest is undertaken by the 
Fiduciaries in good faith. 
, ^ 
Section 1.17 Minutes shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.10. 
Section 1.18 Person, where appropriate, shall refer to either individuals or entities 
(including, but not limited to, corporations, partnerships, estates and trusts) or both. 
Section 1.19 Reformed Declaration of Trust means this Reformed Declaration of Trust 
of The United Effort Plan Trust dated effective the day of October, 2006. 
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Section 1.20 Reports shall have the meaning set forth in Section 8.8. 
Section 1.21 Required Disclosure shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.1.11 (c). 
Section 1.22 Spendthrift Trustee or Spendthrift Trustees means those persons appointed 
as trustees of the spendthrift trusts created pursuant to Section 6.8. 
Section 1.23 Sub S Stock shall have the meaning set forth in Section 5.21.7. 
Section 1.24 Trust means the trust created by the 1942 Trust Declaration as amended 
and restated in the 1998 Restatement and as reformed by this Agreement. 
Section 1.25 Trust Participants shall have the meaning set forth in Section 4.2. 
Section 1.26 Trust Property shall refer to all types of assets which may be owned from 
time to time by the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, including but not limited to tangible and 
intangible assets and real and personal property. 
Section 1.27 Trustee or Trustees means those persons appointed as Trustees of this 
Trust. 
Section 1.28 Utah Code. Utah Code as used herein shall mean the Utah Code of 1953, 
as amended, 
ARTICLE 2 
CONTINUATION OF TRUST 
Section 2.1 Trust Name. The Trust shall continue to be known as The United Effort 
Plan Trust, and shall operate under such other name(s) as the Board may from tinie to time 
designate. 
Section 2.2 Trust Term. This Trust shall continue in perpetuity or for the longest time 
period allowable pursuant to statutory or common law unless the Board determine^ that the 
purposes for the Trust have been fulfilled or the Trust cannot feasibly operate undejr its stated 
purposes, at which time the Board shall terminate the Trust and distribute all of th$ Trust 
Property consistent with the purposes of the Trust as set forth in Article 4. To the extent the rule 
of perpetuities applies, neither this Trust, any trust created by this Trust nor any trust created 
pursuant to the exercise of a special power of appointment granted pursuant to this Trust, shall 
continue beyond the period set forth by the Rule against Perpetuities as applied under the laws of 
the state having jurisdiction of the trust in question. Upon the expiration of the Rule against 
Perpetuities period, the Board, the trustees of any trust created by this Trust and the trustees of 
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any trust created pursuant to the exercise of a special power of appointment granted pursuant to 
this Trust shall terminate the trust and shall distribute the Trust Property consistent with the 
purposes of the Trust as set forth in Article 4. If the permissible distributees' relative interests are 
uncertain, the Board shall distribute the Trust Property to the permissible distributees as the 
Board deems to be consistent with the intent of this Trust Agreement as stated herein. In the 
event the Board is uncertain as to the intent, the Board may seek instructions from a court having 
jurisdiction over the administration of the trust. 
Section 2.3 Irrevocable, Except as otherwise provided herein, this Reformed Trust 
Agreement is irrevocable and neither the Board, any Trust Participant nor any other person shall 
have the power to amend the Reformed Trust Agreement, except upon further order of a court 
having jurisdiction over the administration of the trust as set forth in Section 8.3. 
Section 2.4 Distinct Organization. The Trust is separate and distinct from the United 
Effort Plan, a religious effort, the FLDS Church, as well as any other religious efforts, objectives, 
doctrines or organizations. 
ARTICLE 3 
TRANSFERS IN TRUST 
Section 3.1 General Provisions. The assets currently held by the Trust and any assets 
which subsequently may be transferred to or received by the Trustees shall be held by the 
Trustees in trust and shall be administered upon the terms and conditions and for the purposes 
herein set forth. 
Section 3.2 Contributions. For purposes of this Trust, contributions to the Trust may 
be in the form of real and personal property of any nature and may also include consecrations of 
time, talents, money and materials and improvements to Trust Property (individually a 
"Contribution" and collectively the "Contributions"). 
Section 3.3 Acceptance of Transfers and Contributions. All transfers and 
Contributions to the Trust shall be accepted only if they are without reservation or claim of right 
and/or ownership by the contributor. Additionally, any and all improvements made on or to 
Trust Property shall become the sole property of the Trust without reservation of right or 
ownership. The Board shall have the right to accept or reject any Contributions to the Trust. 
ARTICLE 4 
PURPOSES AND PARTICIPANTS 
Section 4.1 Purposes, The Trust shall be administered and treated as a charitable trust 
as the terai is defined in the Utah Code and applicable common law. Trust Property shall be 
4 5 8 0 7 0 . 1 0 
- 5 -
held, used and distributed to provide for Trust Participants, as defined below, according to their 
wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just. Just wants and needs concern primarily 
housing, with the goal of securing residences for Trust Participants. Secondarilyjust wants and 
needs concern education, including scholarships, occupational training and economic 
development. Just wants and needs may also include food, clothing, medical needs and other 
items within the discretion of the Board. Trust Property may also be held, used and distributed 
for community development, including, but not limited to, community buildings and places, 
schools, parks and cemeteries, etc. . 
Section 4.2 Trust Participants. Individuals who may be privileged to receive benefits 
from the Trust ("Trust Participants") shall be limited to those individuals (1) who can 
demonstrate that they had previously made Contributions to either the Trust or the FLDS Church; 
or (2) who subsequent to date of this Agreement make documented Contributions to the Trust 
which Contributions are approved by the Board. Trust Participant status shall not be based upon 
the value of the property or services contributed and shall be interpreted liberally consistent with 
the charitable purpose of the Trust. 
Section 4.3 Use of Trust Property. The Board in its discretion shall distribute all, part 
or none of the net annual income of the Trust to fulfill the purposes of this Trust. The Board may 
also invade the principal of the Trust to fulfill the purposes of the Trust. 
Section 4.4 Discretion in Fulfillment of Purposes. The Board shall have full discretion 
to fulfill the purposes of this Trust as the Board deems appropriate. 
ARTICLE 5 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
Section 5.1 Board. 
5.1.1 Composition. The Board shall consist of an odd number of Trustees no 
fewer than five and no more than nine Trustees. Trustees should have a demonstrated ability to 
act independently and in the best interest of the Trust and be committed to the general principles 
set forth in the Recitals and the Purposes as set forth in Article 4. 
5.1.2 Appointment. The Initial Board shall be appointed by the Court at such 
time as the Court determines is appropriate. Until the Board receives complete authority for the 
administration of the Trust, the Court shall retain oversight over the Trust and shall determine 
how and by whom the Trust Property shall be administered and the compensation of those 
persons administering the Trust, The Court may transfer duties and authority to the Board in 
stages. The Court may assign to the Board some, all, or none of the duties of Trust 
administration at such times as the Court determines the Board can effectively administer such 
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assigned duties. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, duties and authority previously granted 
to the Special Fiduciary by the Court shall be retained by the Special Fiduciary until the Court 
transfers such duties and authority to the Board. 
5.1.3 Additional or Replacement Trustees. Once the initial Board is appointed, 
additional or replacement Trustees, shall be appointed by the Board. If a Trustee fails or ceases 
to serve or is removed as a Trustee, a replacement Trustee shall be appointed by the Board within 
90 days of such vacancy. All persons who consent to serve as additional or replacement 
Trustees, shall accept in writing the office of Trustee and the fiduciary duties imposed on 
Trustees of the Trust. 
5.1.4 Failure to Replace Trustee. In the event that a replacement Trustee is not 
appointed by the Board within 90 days of a vacancy, a Trustee or Trust Participant may petition a 
court of proper jurisdiction to name a replacement Trustee. 
5.1.5 Term. With the exception of the Initial Board, Trustees shall serve for six-
year terms. The initial Trustees shall be divided into three groups as determined the Court. The 
term for the Initial Trustees comprising the first group shall expire after two years, of the second 
group after four years and of the third group after six years, so that approximately one third of the 
Trustees shall be appointed every second year. Additional Trustees shall be included in the 
group containing the fewest members. A replacement Trustee shall serve for the remaining term 
of the replaced Trustee. Trustees may serve multiple, but not consecutive terms, except as 
otherwise ordered by the Court. 
5.1.6 Removal. A Trustee may be removed upon a showing of good cause, 
upon the affirmative vote of at least 2/3rds of the Trustees. Good cause shall be the failure of 
the Trustee to fulfill his or her obligations under the Agreement or violation of other fiduciary 
obligations imposed by the Agreement or by law. Removal of a Trustee shall be by written 
notice delivered to the removed Trustee, effective at the date and time set forth in the Notice. 
5.1.7 Compensation. The Trustees will initially be compensated on a per 
meeting basis, regardless of the length of the meetings at the rate of One Hundred Seventy-Five 
Dollars ($175.00) per meeting. Compensation of the Trustees may only be changed by the 
unanimous vote of the Trustees. Compensation shall in no event exceed that which would 
ordinarily be paid for like services by charitable enterprises under like circumstances. Travel 
expenses for Trustees will be reimbursed at the same rate paid to Utah State employees for in-
state business travel. Whenever possible, the Board will minimize the costs of travel by using 
available technology, by selecting meeting sites that will most effectively control travel costs, or 
by any other appropriate means. 
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5.1.8 Meetings. Quorums and Voting. 
(a) The Board shall meet at least quarterly, but shall meet as often as 
necessary to effectively administer the Trust. The scheduling and 
agenda of the meetings shall be set by the President. 
(b) A majority of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum for the 
transaction of business at any meeting of the Board. If less than a 
quorum is present at a meeting, the Trustees present may adjourn 
the meeting from time to time without further notice. 
(c) Except as specifically set forth otherwise, the act of a majority of 
the Trustees shall be the act of the Board. 
(d) The Board may permit any Trustee to participate in a regular or 
special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, any 
means of communication by which all Trustees participating may 
hear each other during the meeting. Any Trustee participating in a 
meeting by such means is considered to be present in person at the 
meeting. 
(e) No Trustee may vote by proxy. 
(f) Written notice stating the place, day, and hour of both regular and 
special meetings, and in the case of a special meeting, the purpose 
or purposes for which the meeting is called, which shall be 
delivered not less than five (5) nor more than thirty (30) days 
before the date of the meeting in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 5.1.12, to each Trustee. 
5.1.9 Action Without a Meeting. 
(a) Any action required or permitted to be taken at a Board meeting 
may be taken without a meeting if each and every Trustee in 
writing either: 
(i) votes for the action; or 
(ii) votes against the action or abstains from voting and waives 
the right to demand that action not be taken without a 
meeting. 
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(b) Action is taken under this Section only if the affirmative vote for 
the action equals or exceeds the minimum number of votes that 
would be necessary to take the action at a meeting at which all of 
the Trustees then in office were present and voted. 
(c) An action taken pursuant to this Section may not be effective 
unless the President receives writings describing the action taken 
or otherwise satisfying the requirements of Subsection (a) signed 
by all Trustees which writings are not revoked pursuant to 
Subsection (g), 
(d) The writing described above may be received by electronically 
transmitted facsimile or other form of wire or wireless 
communication ("Electronic Communication") providing the 
President with a complete copy of the document, including a copy 
of the signature on the document. Within a reasonable time after 
execution, the Trustee providing the Electronic Communication 
shall deliver to the President an originally executed writing. For 
purposes of Subsections (f) and (g), the writing shall be deemed 
received by the President when the Electronic Communication is 
received. 
(e) A Trustee's right to demand that action not be taken without a 
meeting shall be considered to have been waived if the President 
receives a writing satisfying the above requirements that has been 
signed by the Trustee and not revoked pursuant to Subsection (g). 
(f) Action taken pursuant to this Section shall be effective when the 
last writing necessary to effect the action is received by the 
President, unless the writings describing the action taken set forth a 
different effective date. 
(g) Any Tmstee who has signed a writing pursuant to this Section may 
revoke the writing by a writing signed and dated by the Trustee, 
describing the action and stating that the Trustee's prior vote with 
respect to the writing is revoked if the revocation is received by the 
President before the last writing necessary to effect the action is 
received by the President. 
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(h) Action taken pursuant to this Section has the same effect as action 
taken at a meeting of the Board and may be described as an action 
taken at a meeting of the Board in any document. 
5.1.10 Minutes of Board Meetines and Resolutions on Actions Without 
Meetings. Except as otherwise set forth in this Section 5.1.10, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Board and copies of Resolutions of the Board taken Without a Meeting (collectively the 
"Minutes") shall be made available as set forth in Section 8.8 within ten (10) days after approval 
of the Minutes. Information contained in the Minutes which is determined by the unanimous' 
vote of the Trustees to be sensitive need not be made available, however, a notation shall be 
made in the minutes that sensitive information has been omitted. 
5.1.11 Conflicts of Interest. 
(a) Any Trustee who has a potential Conflicting Interest in any 
decision being considered by the Board (the "Disclosing Trustee") 
shall disclose such conflict by making a Required Disclosure prior 
to any action by the Board. 
(b) A "Conflicting interest" with respect to the Trust means the interest 
the Disclosing Trustee has respecting a transaction effected or 
proposed to be effected by the Trust if the Disclosing Trustee 
knows that the Disclosing Trustee or a member of the Disclosing 
Trustee's family is either a party to the transaction or has a 
beneficial financial interest in, or is so closely linked to, the 
transaction and the transaction is so financially significant to the 
Disclosing Trustee or a member of the Disclosing Trustee's family 
that the interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence 
on the Disclosing Trustee's judgment. 
(c) "Required disclosure" means disclosure by the Disclosing Trustee 
of the existence and nature of the Conflicting Interest; and all facts 
known to the Disclosing Trustee respecting the subject matter of 
the transaction that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably 
believe to be material to a judgment about whether or not to 
proceed with the transaction. 
(d) The Board, in its discretion, shall have the right to require the 
Disclosing' 
transaction. 
sing Trustee to recuse himself or herself from voting on that 
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5.1.12 Notice. 
(a) All notices provided for by this Agreement shall be made in 
writing (1) either by actual delivery of the notice into the hands of 
the parties thereunto entitled, (2) by facsimile transmission, (3) by 
electronic delivery with confiimed receipt, or (4) by the mailing of 
the notice in the U.S. mails to the address appearing on the books 
of the Trust or given by the person entitled to notice to the Trust 
for the purpose of notice, certified mail, return receipt requested 
(postage prepaid). If no address for a person entitled to notice 
appears on the Trust's books or is given by such person, notice 
shall be deemed to have been given if sent by mail to the last 
address for such person, known to the Trust. 
(b) Notice shall be deemed to be received in case (1) on the date of its 
actual receipt by the party entitled thereto, in case (2) and (3) the 
notice shall be considered delivered upon completion of the 
transmission by the sender and the receipt by the sender of an 
affirmative indication that the message has been successfully 
transmitted, and in case (4) three (3) days after the date when 
deposited in the United States mail. 
(c) If any notice addressed to a person at the address of such person 
appearing on the books and records of the Trust is returned to the 
Trust by the United States Postal Service marked to indicate that 
the United States Postal Service cannot deliver the notice to the 
person at such address, all future notices or reports shall be deemed 
to have been duly given without further mailing if the same shall 
be available to the person upon written demand of the person at the 
principal executive office of the Trust for a period of one (1) year 
from the date of the giving of such notice. 
(d) A certificate or an affidavit of the mailing, transmission or other 
means of giving any notice of any meeting shall be executed by the 
President and shall be filed and maintained in the minute book of 
the Trust. 
5.1.13 Waiver of Notice. If notice is required to be given to a Trustee, a waiver 
in writing signed by the person or persons entitled to the notice, whether made before or after the 
time for notice to be given, is equivalent to the giving of notice. 
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Section 5.2 General Powers and Duties. 
5.2.1 Except as otherwise set forth herein, the Board shall have ail power 
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this Trust Agreement and specifically those powers 
set forth in Utah Code Sections 75-7-813 and 814, as it now exists and as it may be amended in 
the future. The Board shall have: (1) the power to hire employees and/or independent contractors 
to handle the administrative duties of the Trustees, (2) the power to adopt bylaws to govern the 
administration of the affairs of the Trustees, (3) the power to delegate its responsibilities to 
individual Trustees or committees, and (4) the power to act by written approval of the Board 
without the necessity of a formal meeting, (5) to invest Trust Property in all types of investments 
permissible by law for investment of Trust Property including, but not limited to, limited 
partnerships, limited liability companies, etc , (6) the power to manage the Trust Property, and 
(7) the power to employ attorneys, accountants, brokers and other agents at the expense of the 
Trust and such expenses shall not be deducted from any Trustee's reasonable fee for services 
herein. 
5.2.2 In addition to all of the powers granted to the Trustees pursuant to this 
Trust Agreement and by law, the Board shall have the power to establish separate organizations, 
including profit and non-profit entities, if necessary, to cany forth the necessary administration 
and purposes of the Trust. 
5.2.3 It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Board to determine how best 
to fulfill the purposes of the Trust and specifically how to invest, administer and distribute the 
Trust Property. 
5.2.4 To the extent that the Trust's Purpose conflicts with provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, Utah Code Title 75, Chapter 7, Part 9, the Board shall be relieved 
of any obligation under that Act. 
Section 5.3 Specific Powers and Duties, Without limiting the authority conferred by 
Utah Code Sections 75-7-813, the Board may: 
5.3.1 determine Trust Participants; 
5.3.2 determine the benefits available, if any, to Trust Participants; 
5.3.3 determine the terms and conditions governing occupancy and use of Trust 
Property and, where appropriate, enter into occupancy agreements with individual Trust 
Participants; 
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5.3.4 manage all other aspects of Trust Property, including collecting taxes, 
resolving occupancy claims and disputes; 
5.3.5 distribute or sell Trust Property to settle legal or equitable claims brought 
against the Trust or for any other legitimate Trust purpose; 
Section 5.4 Investments. The Board may purchase, acquire or retain any kind of 
investment asset which a trustee may hold under the law of the jurisdiction in which the Trust is 
being administered. The Board's actions in managing the Trust Property shall be measured by 
the overall performance of the Trust Property, and not by the performance or lack of performance 
of individual assets. 
Section 5.5 Types of Transactions. The Board may sell, exchange, lease, pledge, 
mortgage, transfer, convert, or otherwise dispose of or grant options with respect to any Trust 
Property. The Board may enter into leases and contracts even though the term of the lease or 
contract may extend beyond the period fixed by statute for leases or contracts made by fiduciaries 
or beyond the duration of any trust hereunder. 
Section 5.6 Duty to inform and report. 
5.6.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Section 75-7-811, the Board 
shall only be required to make the following reports: 
(a) Such reports as are requested by the Court or as reasonably 
required by any court having jurisdiction over the administration of 
the trust; 
(b) At least annually and at the termination of the Trust a report of the 
Trust Property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including 
the amount of the Trustees1 compensation or a fee schedule or other 
writing showing how the Trustees' compensation was determined, 
a listing of the Trust Property and, if feasible, their respective 
market values (the "Annual Report"). 
5.6.2 The Annual Report shall be made available as set forth in Section 8.8 
within 90 days of the end of each fiscal year of the Trust. 
Section 5.7 Borrowing. The Board may borrow money from any source for the benefit 
of the Trust, and as security for any such loan, may mortgage or pledge any Trust Property, A 
Trustee may loan money to the Trust with the approval of the Board provided the terms of the 
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loan are no more beneficial to the Trustee than those terms that would be charged by a 
commercial lender in the community in which the Trust is being administered. 
Section 5.8 Management. The Board may vote any shares of stock or other securities, 
membership or partnership interests, etc. held by the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, in person or 
by general or limited proxy. The Board may execute, rescind, terminate or amend any voting 
trust agreement. If the Trust becomes a party to a voting trust agreement, the Board may deposit 
securities or other property with a trustee or accept securities as a trustee (whether or not the 
voting trust agreement extends beyond the duration of the trust). The Board may consent, 
directly or through a committee or agent, to any recapitalization, reorganization, consolidation, 
merger, dissolution or liquidation of any corporation, partnership, limited liability company or 
association in which the Trust has an interest. The Board may make any payments, assignments, 
or subscriptions and take any other steps which the Board may deem necessary or proper to 
enable the Trust to obtain the benefits of any of these transactions. 
Section 5.9 Insurance. The Board may purchase and retain life, fire, rent, title, liability 
or casualty insurance or any other insurance as the Board deems advisable under the 
circumstances. 
Section 5.10 Principal and Income. The Board shall have discretion to determine what 
is principal or income and to apportion and'to allocate its receipts, taxes and other expenses and 
charges between the two. Except as otherwise determined by the Board, the Board shall allocate 
receipts and disbursements between principal and income in accordance with the Utah Revised 
Uniform Principal and Income Act (Utah Code Section 22-3-101 et al.). The Board does not 
need to maintain a separate income account. The Board may accumulate income notwithstanding 
the provisions of Sections 665 through 667 of the IRC Code. The Board may treat accumulated 
income as principal. 
Section 5.11 Tax Elections. The Board shall have the power to make tax elections as 
the Board deems advisable for the benefit of the Trust and the Trust Participants. 
Section 5.12 Settlement of Claims. The Board shall have the power to commence or 
defend, at the expense of the Trust, such litigation with respect to the Trust or any Trust Property 
as the Board considers advisable. The Board shall have power to renew, assign, alter, extend, 
compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration, obligations or 
claims held by or asserted against the Trust. 
Section 5.13 Reserves for Amortization, Obsolescence. Depreciation and Depletion. 
The Board may charge to operating expense all current costs of amortization, obsolescence, 
depreciation and depletion of any Trust Property and may provide adequate reserves for 
amortization, obsolescence, depreciation and depletion. 
•14-
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Section 5.14 Agents. The Trust may hold investments in the name of a nominee or a 
substitute trustee and may employ brokers, agents, attorneys and custodians for any Trust 
Property. 
Section 5.15 Reimbursement of Advances. The Board may reimburse a Trustee out of 
the Trust for all advances made for the benefit or protection of the Trust or the Trust Property and 
for all expenses, losses and liabilities incurred in connection with the administration of the Trust 
not resulting from a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the 
purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries-
Section 5.16 Distributions in Kind. The Board may make any distributions or payments 
in kind, or cause any shares to be composed of cash, property or undivided fractional interests in 
property different in kind from any other share. The Board shall determine the value of any 
distributions in kind. The Board may acquire assets for distribution in kind to the Trust 
Participants. 
Section 5.17 Trust Expenses. The Board may pay from either income or principal of 
the Trust the expenses of administering the Trust; however, the Board shall allocate Trust 
expenses between income and principal in accordance with Section '5.10 above. 
Section 5.18 Payments to Minors or Legally Disabled Trust Participants. 
5.18.1 In the event the Board desires to make distribution to a Trust Participant 
who is under the age of twenty one (21) years, the Board may distribute the distribution to a 
custodian for that Trust Participant under a Uniform Gifts or Transfers to Minors Act. 
5.18.2 In the event the Board desires to make distribution to a Trust Participant 
who is under a legal disability other than minority, the Board may make distribution by one or 
more of the following methods: (a) by making distribution to the Trust Participant's legal 
Guardian or Conservator; (b) by making distribution on behalf of the Trust Participant to any one 
with whom the Trust Participant resides; (c) by making distribution to third parties in discharge 
of the Trust Participant's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on insurance policies; or 
(d) by making distribution to the Trust Participant directly. 
Section 5.19 Consolidation. The Board may consolidate the Trust Property or of any 
trust hereunder with any other trust provided proper records are kept of the Trust Property 
allocable to each trust and there will be no unfavorable tax consequences as a result of 
consolidation. In this regard, the Board is instructed to carefully review the possibility of 
unfavorable generation skipping tax consequences as a result of a consolidation of separate 
trusts. If the Board consolidates separate trusts, the Board shall not be required to physically 
divide any of the investments or any other property unless necessary or deemed advisable for the 
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purpose of distribution. Instead, the Board may keep any part of the consolidated trusts in one or 
more funds in which the separate and distinct trusts shall have undivided interests. 
Section 5.20 Acting in Other Jurisdictions. If for any reason the Board is required or 
deems it advisable to take any action in any jurisdiction in which it is illegal or inadvisable for 
the Board to act in that jurisdiction, the Board may appoint another person or corporation to act 
in the other jurisdiction as the Board deems advisable. The person appointed shall be required to 
accept the office of Trustee and the fiduciary duties imposed on Trustees of the Trust. 
Section 5.21 Miscellaneous Trustee Provisions. The Board shall have the following 
powers: 
5.21.1 Lending Money. To lend money to any person subject to such security and 
interest requirements as determined by the Board." 
5.21.2 Withholding Distributions. To withhold Trust Property from distribution 
without payment of interest, if at the time for distribution of the Trust Property the Board 
determines that the Trust Property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to 
liabilities, contingent or otherwise, which properly must be resolved before distribution can be 
made. 
5.21.3 Purchase Bonds at Premium. To purchase bonds and to pay premiums in 
connection with the purchase as the Board, in its discretion, considers advisable; provided, 
lowever, that the Board shall treat part of the interest payments on the bond, or sales proceeds if 
necessary, as the repayment of principal as is reasonable under the circumstances. 
5.21.4 Purchase Bonds at Discount. To purchase bonds at a discount from face 
value as the Board, in its discretion, considers advisable; provided, however, that the Board shall 
treat part of the return of principal as income as is reasonable under the circumstances. 
5.21.5 Proration. Upon the termination of any trust, the Board shall distribute 
undistributed, accrued income to the Trust or the Trust Participants as determined by the Board. 
5.21.6 Partnership or Limited Liability Company. In addition to any other rights 
granted to the Board, the Board shall have the right to authorize the Trust to enter into general or 
limited partnership agreements, to execute Certificates of General or Limited Partnership and/or 
to serve as a General and/or Limited Partner. The Board shall also have the right to authorize the 
Trust to enter into limited liability company agreements, to execute the Articles of Organization 
thereof and to serve as a member and/or manager of such companies. 
4 S 8 0 7 0 . 1 
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5.21.7 S Corporation Stock. If this Trust holds stock in an S Corporation, as that 
term is defined by IRC Code Section 1361 (hereinafter "Sub S Stock"), the Board, in the Board's 
sole discretion, may reform the Trust, or any sub-trust into which the Sub S Stock is or may be 
transferred, establish separate trusts or divide existing trusts so that such trust, as reformed, is 
qualified as a Subchapter S corporation shareholder Trust under IRC Code Section 1361. 
Section 5.22 Delegation. 
5.22.1 The Board may delegate investment and management functions that a 
prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The Board 
may not delegate the Board's discretionary authority to determine the amount, timing and 
recipient of distributions from the Trust. The Board shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and 
caution in: 
(a) selecting the agent; 
(b) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation consistent with 
the purposes of the trust; and 
(c) periodically reviewing the agent's actions to monitor the agent's 
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation. 
5.22.2 In performing a delegated function, an agent has a duty to the Trust to 
exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation. 
5.22.3 A Trustee who complies with the requirements of this Subsection 5.22 is 
not liable to the Trust, any trust created hereunder, the Trust Participants or other beneficiaries of 
the Trust or any trust created hereunder for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the 
function was delegated. 
Section 5.23 President and Other Officers. The Board shall annually elect one of the 
Trustees as President of the Board. The Board may also elect such other officers or establish such 
committees as the Board deems necessary, shall designate the duties of such officers and 
committees and shall establish a chain of command as appropriate. Other than the President, 
officers shall not be required to be Trustees. The President shall execute any necessary 
documents on behalf of the Trust, including contracts, deeds, transfers, assignments and other 
documents to manage and carry out the purposes of the Trust, unless the Board designates others 
to execute such documents. The President shall also be responsible for scheduling and setting the 
agenda for Board meetings as requested by individual Trustees and as necessary to address 
effectively the needs of the Trust. All officers and committee members shall serve at the 
pleasure of the Board and may be removed at anytime by the Board. 
-17-
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ARTICLE 6 
DISTRIBUTIONS. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND USE OF TRUST PROPERTY 
Section 6.1 Distributions. The Board may from time to time distribute Trust Property 
as they deem advisable to individual Trust Participants, or all of them, in accordance with the 
Trust's overall purpose as set forth herein. Such distributions may be made to or for the benefit of 
the Trust Participants by any means deemed appropriate by the Board, including transfers by 
deed or in trust or by other appropriate instalment or means. It is specifically contemplated that 
property conveyances to Trust Participants through the means of spendthrift trusts may be a 
necessary and appropriate method to accomplish the ultimate goal of securing residences for 
Trust Participants 
Section 6.2 Right to Trust Property. No Trust Participant shall have a right to Trust 
Property. No'single factor defining just wants and needs shall obligate the Board to use or 
distribute Trust Property to or for the benefit of any Trust Participant. The determination of the 
just wants and needs of a Trust Participant shall be made in the sole and absolute discretion of 
the Board. 
Section 63 Mechanism for Trust Participants to Petition for Benefits. Any Trust 
Participant may make a request for benefits from the Trust by filing with the Board (or its 
authorized representative), a written petition setting forth the benefits desired and the facts and 
circumstances supporting such petition. Neither the filing of a petition nor the failure of the 
Board to respond to a petition shall entitled a Trust Participant to any benefit from the Trust. 
The Board may respond to the petition at such time, if ever, and in such manner as the Board in 
its sole discretion determines. 
Section 6.4 Factors to Consider. Consistent with their fiduciary duties under the Utah 
Trust Code and the common law, the Board should use their life experiences, good judgment and 
common sense in administering the Trust Property and may consider some or all of the following 
factors in administering the Trust: 
6.4.1 the financial condition and needs of the Trust Participant including 
existing or potential sources of income, compensation or other recovery; 
6.4.2 the previous or present use of Trust Property by the Trust Participant, 
including the length of time the Trust Participant has used and relied on Trust Property; 
6.43 the Trust Participant's cooperation with the Board, acceptance of 
occupancy agreements, operation of businesses on Trust Property consistent with the Trust's 
purposes and compliance with the rules and standards set by the Board; 
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6.4.4 the contribution of services or assets to the Trust, including improvements 
to Trust Property by the Trust Participant; 
6.4.5 the efforts of the Trust Participant to protect Trust Property through 
donations for the payment of property taxes, land surveys, insurance premiums and other 
expenses related to the Trust; 
6.4.6 the Trust Participant's efforts to keep Trust Property safe, in good repair 
and otherwise properly maintained; 
6.4.7 the Trust Participant's ability or inability to cooperate openly with the 
Board; 
6.4.8 any legitimate grievance a Trust Participant may have against the Trust; 
and 
6.4.9 recommendations received from an authorized representative of the FLDS 
Church concerning what a particular Trust Participant's just wants and needs may be in light of 
the religious principles of the FLDS Church. These recommendations shall be non-binding and 
shall be only one criterion to be considered and shall not be the controlling criterion. No 
recommendation may be considered, however, if it benefits, advocates or facilitates illegal 
practices. If the FLDS Church wishes to provide recommendations with respect to the just wants 
and needs of Trust Participants, it shall designate an authorized representative and shall 
communicate such designation to the Board in writing. The authorized representative may 
provide input to the Board in writing and/or may be given the opportunity to provide input at the 
meetings of the Board. 
Section 6.5 Prohibited Consideration Factors. In administering the Trust, the Board 
shall not consider whether any Trust Participant participates in polygamy. In so doing, the Board 
will not be deemed to be benefitting, advocating or facilitating illegal practices. 
Section 6.6 Occupancy and Use of Trust Property for Benefit of Trust Participants. 
6.6.1 In addition to, or in lieu of, outright distributions of Trust Property, the 
Board may allow Trust Participants to occupy and use Trust Property, including real property 
and/or tangible personal property for Trust purposes. Such use of Trust Property by a Trust 
Participant shall not affect the record or beneficial ownership of such Trust Property, shall not be 
construed as a distribution, payment or delivery of such Trust Property by the Trust to the Trust 
Participant and the Trust shall retain all rights of ownership in such Trust Property. 
-19-
4 5 8 0 7 0 . 1 0 
6.6.2 Except as may otherwise be provided by the orders of courts of competent 
jurisdiction, the privilege to reside upon Tmst real property and to occupy and use Trust Property 
is granted, and may be revoked, by the Board pursuant to Trust purposes. The use and/or 
occupancy of Trust Property is not and does not become a right or claim of anyone against the 
Trust. 
6.6.3 Trust Participant use and occupancy of Trust Property must comply with 
rules and standards set by the Board. For example, the Board may require Trust Participants to 
do the following with respect to the Trust Property they use or occupy: 
(a) enter into occupancy agreements setting forth in detail the 
privileges and responsibilities associated with residing and/or 
operating businesses on Trust Property; 
(b) pay all property taxes and assessments; 
(c) secure and maintain adequate property insurance; 
(d) comply with all applicable governmental ordinances, codes and 
regulations; 
(e) operate businesses established on Trust Property consistent with 
the puiposes of the Trust; 
(f) pay any other costs directly related to the Trust Property, such as a 
pro-rata share of survey costs, administrative costs, etc.; 
(g) keep the Trust Property safe, in good repair and to otherwise care 
for and maintain the Trust Property; and 
(h) pay rent and other costs and expenses as determined by the Board 
for the use of Trust Property and for community development, 
including, but not limited to, community buildings and places, 
schools, parks and cemeteries, etc. 
6.6.4 To accomplish Trust purposes, the Board may require that Trust 
Participants and their families relocate to different locations on Trust Property, require them to 
share a location with others or revoke completely a Trust Participant's privilege to use and/or 
occupy Trust Property. 
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6.6.5 People who are granted the privilege to occupy or use Trust Property 
acknowledge by such occupancy or use their acceptance of the terms of this Agreement. 
Section 6.7 Tax Effect of Distribution. The Board may, prior to a distribution, 
determine the tax effect of the distribution and may determine the persons responsible for 
payment of such taxes and may condition distributions upon the acceptance by the distributee of 
such responsibility. 
Section 6.8 Spendthrift Trusts. The Board is specifically empowered to convey Trust 
Property to or for the benefit of Trust Participants through the means of individual spendthrift 
trusts if the Board in its discretion deems it appropriate. Trust Participants maybe the 
beneficiaries of such spendthrift trusts. 
Any spendthrift trust thus created shall meet the following requirements: 
6.8.1 All conveyances of Trust Property into spendthrift trusts shall be 
irrevocable and in writing; 
6.8.2 The Spendthrift Trustees and successor Spendthrift Trustees shall be 
appointed by the Board; 
6.8.3 The spendthrift trust shall be in a form substantially similar to the 
spendthrift trust set forth in Exhibit "A", attached hereto; however, the Board may in its 
discretion determine the terms of any spendthrift trust as they deem appropriate. 
Section 6.9 Claims Against Trust. The Board, in its sole discretion, may postpone, 
delay or refrain from making any or all distributions of Trust Property pending resolution of 
claims against the Trust. 
ARTICLE 7 
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST - FIDUCIARY MATTERS GENERALLY 
Section 7.1 Bonds for Fiduciaries. Except as otherwise required by the Court, no 
Fiduciary appointed hereunder, wherever acting, shall be required to give bond or surety. 
Section 12 Fiduciary Liability. An Individual Fiduciary hereunder shall be liable only 
for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the puiposes of the 
trust or the interests of the beneficiaries and not for any honest error in judgment. No hidividual 
Fiduciary hereunder shall be liable for any action taken or not taken in reliance upon the opinion 
or advice of counsel, nor for the default or misconduct of any counsel, agent (including a 
professional investment manager) or other representative selected by such Fiduciary with 
reasonable care and in good faith. In any contract or agreement made by a Fiduciary on behalf of 
the Trust, the Fiduciary may and is hereby authorized to stipulate and provide against personal 
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liability on such contracts. The rights created under and by virtue of such contract or contracts 
shall belong to the Trust, and the obligations under and by virtue of such contract or contracts 
shall be the obligation of the Trust. A Fiduciary shall not be personally liable on contracts 
properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the Trust. A 
Corporate Fiduciary acting hereunder shall be liable and responsible to the degree required by the 
laws of the state wherein it is authorized to act as a fiduciary. No Fiduciary shall be personally 
liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of Trust Property or for any torts 
committed in the course of administration of the Trust unless he is personally at fault. 
Section 7.3 Indemnification of Fiduciaries, 
7.3.1 Extent of Indemnification. With the exception of damages, if a Trustee 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the Trustee is 
entitled to receive from the Trust the necessary expenses and disbursements, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred. As to damages, the Trust shall indemnify each Fiduciary 
from any and all damages required to be paid to a third party except for damages resulting from a 
Fiduciary's breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of 
the Trust or the interests of the beneficiaries. 
7.3.2 Advances. The Trust may pay for or reimburse the reasonable 
expenses incurred by a Trustee who is a party to a proceeding in advance of final disposition of 
the proceeding if: 
(a) The Trustee delivers to the Board a written affirmation of his good 
faith belief that he has met the applicable standard of conduct 
described in Utah Code Section 75-7-1004; 
(b) The Trustee delivers to the Board a written undertaking, executed 
personally or on his behalf, to repay the advance if it is ultimately 
determined that he did not meet the standard of conduct; and 
(c) A determination is made by the Board (with the Trustee to be 
indemnified abstaining) that the facts then known to the Board 
would not preclude indemnification under this Section . 
The undertaking required by Section 7.3.2(b) must be an unlimited general 
obligation of the Trustee but need not be secured and may be accepted without reference to 
financial ability to make repayment. 
Section 7.4 Transition on Change of Fiduciaries. 
7.4.1 An outgoing Fiduciary, upon the effective date of removal, resignation, 
incapacity or death, shall cease to have any powers or discretions hereunder. At the earliest 
possible date thereafter, the outgoing Fiduciary, or his or her legal representative, shall deliver to 
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such Fiduciary's successor or to another then acting Fiduciary hereunder all of the Trust Property 
and original records which were in the possession of such Fiduciary and shall make available to 
each Fiduciary a complete record and inventory of the Trust Property and/or records for which 
the Fiduciary had responsibility. 
7.4.2 Each successor Fiduciary, upon assumption of his fiduciary 
responsibilities, shall have the same powers and duties as his or her predecessor. The assumption 
by a successor Fiduciary shall not be complete until such successor executes a written acceptance 
of his office. 
7.4.3 No successor Fiduciary shall be held liable for any mistake, negligence or 
willful misconduct of any preceding Fiduciary. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
no Fiduciary shall be held liable for failing to make an examination of the actions or accounts of 
any preceding Fiduciary. If a successor Fiduciary learns of a breach of duty by a preceding 
Fiduciary, the successor Fiduciary shall as soon as reasonably practicable notify the Board of the 
breach. However, a successor Fiduciary's failure to notify the Board of a predecessor's breach 
shall not be grounds for a surcharge action against the successor Fiduciary. Fiduciaries shall be 
liable for their acts and omissions in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where the Trust 
is being administered. 
Section 7.5 Fiduciary Determinations of Fact. All fiduciary determinations of fact 
made in the course of carrying out the terms of this Trust, if reasonably made on the basis of the 
then available information, shall be binding upon all concerned and shall fully protect the 
Fiduciaries even though it may subsequently be found that such a determination was erroneous. 
Section 7.6 Fiduciary Construction of Instrument. The Fiduciaries may construe this 
instrument, if reasonably made, and any action taken relying upon such construction shall be 
binding upon all concerned and shall fully protect the Fiduciaries even though it may be 
subsequently determined that such construction is erroneous. Moreover, the Fiduciaries shall 
construe every provision of this Trust which is designed to meet specific requirements of the IRC 
Code in accordance with that design. Thus, if the IRC Code is changed, the Fiduciaries shall 
construe each affected provision of the Trust accordingly. 
Section 7.7 Fiduciary Protection. If a Fiduciary disagrees with the actions taken or to 
be taken by the remaining Fiduciaries and if the Fiduciary could be held accountable for those 
actions, the Fiduciary may absolve himself or herself from any liability for the action taken or to 
be taken provided such Fiduciary supplies the remaining Fiduciaries with written notice of his or 
her disagreement within a reasonable time after the Fiduciary desiring to absolve himself or 
herself becomes aware of the action taken or to be taken. 
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ARTICLE 8 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Section 8.1 Governing Law. The construction and interpretation of this Trust and all 
questions concerning its administration shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
Section 8.2 Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Trust shall be January 1 to December 
31. The fiscal year of the Trust may be changed by the Board from time to time as it deems 
advisable. 
Section 8.3 Amendments, This Trust shall be irrevocable except as follows: 
8.3.1 Upon further order of the Court. 
8.3.2 Upon the affirmative vote of the Board and with notice to the Attorney 
General of the States of Utah and Arizona, the Board may petition a court of appropriate 
jurisdiction for an order amending this Trust Agreement. Such an order should issue only upon a 
showing that the amendment requested is appropriate for the effective management of the Trust 
or for the continued fulfillment of its purposes. 
Section 8.4 Trust Additions. The Board may accept any transfer (whether inter vivos 
or testamentary) of additional assets to the Trust after considering the tax, business, and potential 
liability and other consequences of such acceptance to the purposes of the Trust. Such 
acceptance may include the acceptance or imposition of conditions on the transfer. If the 
addition is made by will or trust, the Board may accept the statement of the personal 
representative or trustees that the assets delivered to the Trust constitute all of the assets to which 
the Trust is entitled without inquiring into the personal representative's or trustees's 
administration or accounting. 
Section 8.5 Separability of Provisions. In the event that any provision of this Trust 
Agreement violates any rule or law, only such invalid provision and not the entire instrument 
shall be considered void and all of the other provisions hereof shall remain in full force and 
effect. 
Section 8.6 Interpretation. Whenever necessary in this Trust Agreement and where the 
context requires, the singular term and the related pronoun shall include the plural, and the 
masculine feminine and neuter terms and pronouns shall be fully interchangeable. 
Section 8.7 Descriptive Titles. The descriptive titles of the Articles, Sections and 
Paragraphs as used in this Trust Agreement are for convenience only and any construction of this 
Trust Agreement shall be made without reference to such titles. 
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Section 8.8 Delivery of Minutes and Annual Report. The Board shall be deemed to 
have made the Minutes and/or Annual Report (collectively the "Reports") available by delivering 
a copy of the Reports to each Trustee and either: 
8.8.1 mailing a copy of the Reports to those Trust Participants who have 
requested a copy in writing and who have provided an address for delivery (the "Designated 
Recipients"); or 
8.8.2 posting and maintaining for a reasonable period of time the Reports on a 
website and notifying the Designated Recipients of the website 
ARTICLE 9 
INTERPRETATION OF ORIGINAL INTENT 
In the event that the purposes for which this Trust has been created cannot, at any time, be 
carried out, the Fiduciaries are to administer the Trust for other purposes which are as similar to 
the original purposes as is reasonably possible and which are consistent with federal, state and 
common law. 
Dated the A$~ day of October, 2006. 
BY THE CO 
District Co^'Judge:^'v" J 
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Appendix 3 
Kenneth A. Okazaki (USB #3844) 
Stephen C. Clark (USB #4551) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main St., Ste. 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537 
James C. Bradshaw (#3768) 
BROWN, BRADSHAW & MOFFAT, L.L.P. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5297 
Facsimile: (801) 532-5298 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, an association of individuals, 
v. 
JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG, Third 
District Court Judge, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIE JESSOP IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Supreme Court No. 
Trial Court No. 053900848 
Subject to Assignment to 
the Utah Court of Appeals 
Petitioner Requests that the Utah 
Supreme Court Retain Jurisdiction 
STATE OF ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
I, Willie Jessop, being duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
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Rodney R. Parker (USB #4110) 
Richard A. Van Wagoner (USB #4690) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
1. l a member and duly authorized representative of the Petitioner Association, 
which comprises an informal association of members of the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Church" or the "Church"). I am also a 
member in good standing of the FLDS Church, and a beneficiary of the United Effort 
Plan Trust, which is the subject of this action. 
2. I am over 18 years of age and am otherwise competent to testify to the facts 
set forth herein. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein unless otherwise 
stated, and as to other matters I attest thereto to the best of my knowledge, information 
and/or belief, including my sincere religious belief. 
4. Petitioner Association members are a voluntary group of persons, without a 
formal charter, formed by mutual consent for the purpose of promoting our common 
objective of securing our constitutional rights against state action that has prevented us 
from exercising core tenets of our religion and that is tearing at the spiritual and 
economic heart of our community. 
5. The FLDS Church is based on the "fundamental" teachings of our Savior as 
recorded in ancient scripture and revealed through modem-day Prophets. We believe that 
we have been sent to the earth to learn who God is and how to become like Him. We 
claim the privilege of worshiping God as guaranteed by the Constitution; we believe this 
same privilege belongs to all as a matter of law and divine right. 
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6. In the 1930's, a small group of FLDS Church faithful began to settle on a 
piece of land straddling the borders of Utah and Arizona. This area became known as 
Short Creek. 
7. I have lived in the Short Creek area all my life, and I have seen the 
communities there grow and thrive as a result of the hard work and the faithfulness of the 
people. 
8. We worked hard to turn the desert landscape into fertile fields and productive 
farms and ranches. We worked hard to create small businesses. We worked hard to 
build communities on principles of self-reliance, charity and brotherhood. 
9. As I explain below, in the last few years our communities and our faith have 
come under sustained and systematic attack by the State of Utah. The principal means by 
which that attack has been carried out is the State's takeover of a sacred Trust and 
appointment of a self-proclaimed "State-Ordained Bishop" to administer the Trust. 
10. As a result of the State's actions, the farms, ranches, businesses and 
communities we worked so hard to create and consecrated and dedicated to the common 
good through the Trust, have been decimated. The people are destitute, without homes, 
without livelihoods, without property, without food, having their power cut off. Daily I 
hear the pleas of my brothers and sisters, because they've lost their homes and their jobs, 
and everything they know and hold dear and sacred is disappearing under constant attack. 
11. Millions of dollars in property and assets have been confiscated or sold. To 
cite just one example, the Harker Farm was formerly one of the largest and most 
productive dairy farms in the State of Utah, with 700 head of dairy cows and state-of-the-
3 
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art facilities. The Farm, along with dozens of other properties and small businesses, has 
been ripped from the heart of the community and used, not for the common benefit of the 
people, but to pay the fees and costs of the "State-Ordained Bishop" and the large state 
bureaucracy he has used to supplant the Holy United Order we created. While millions 
of dollars have been sucked out of the Trust, not one penny has gone to provide food, 
clothing or shelter to the people who were supposed to share in and be sustained by the 
Trust. 
12. As I explain below, the "State-Ordained Bishop" now plans to auction off 
land that has not only served as the breadbasket of our community, but also is the site of a 
prophetic vision to build a Holy Temple. We ask this Court to stop this sale and hear our 
claims. 
13. As faithful members of the FLDS Church, I and other member of Petitioner 
Association believe its doctrines and tenets and have sought to put those doctrines and 
tenets into practice through consecrating our time, talents, materials and property to the 
Church, as discussed below. 
14. The FLDS Church teaches as one of its fundamental tenets that there must be 
a literal gathering together of the faithful Church members on consecrated and sacred 
lands to establish the Kingdom of God on Earth under the guidance of divinely-inspired 
Church leadership. 
15. This tenet, along with specific instruction on how it is to be implemented, is 
set forth in a book called the "Doctrine and Covenants," which we revere as Holy 
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Scripture, as well as in the Holy Bible, the Book of Mormon, the Pearl of Great Price and 
sermons of Church leaders. 
16. This tenet gets further implementation in the day-to-day decisions of the 
Bishops ordained to ascertain and minister to the needs of their congregations with the 
guiding Light of divine inspiration. 
17. As a matter of religious faith and devotion, we believe we have been 
commanded by God, through the Prophet God called to establish his Kingdom on Earth 
in these "latter days," to consecrate our property, services, time and talents to the FLDS 
Church, for the purpose of building that Kingdom. 
18. The principles and practices that underlie our consecrations to the FLDS 
Church are referred to as the Holy United Order. The scriptural foundation of the Holy 
United Order is found in Doctrine and Covenants 42:30-39. 
19. In order to facilitate our efforts toward the Holy United Order, an "Amended 
and Restated Declaration of Trust of the United Effort Plan" was executed on November 
3, 1998 (the "Trust"). 
20. As FLDS Church members, in accordance with our internal church practices, 
we were given the opportunity to sustain, and we unanimously voted to sustain, the Trust. 
21. We did so with the express understanding and belief, based on the terms of 
the Trust itself and as a matter of religious faith and devotion, that the Priesthood leaders 
of the Church act with the authority and under the divine inspiration of Jesus Christ in 
carrying out the Church's religious mission and purpose, including the administration of 
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the Trust and determining the just wants and needs of Church members, and thereby are 
engaged in establishing the Kingdom of God on earth. 
22. It is because we maintain this belief that we are willing to consecrate our real 
property as well as out time, talents, money and materials to the Trust and to authorize 
the Board of Trustees in their sole discretion to provide for us according to their wants 
and needs, insofar as our wants are just. This belief is set forth in Doctrine and 
Covenants 82: 17-21. 
23. The scriptures and tenets of our faith make it clear that any determination of 
our "just wants and needs" is fundamentally a religious determination. 
24. Our understanding and intent in voting to sustain and consecrate to the Trust 
was that by doing so, we were not creating an ordinary charitable trust that would exist 
independent of any religious belief or practice, but engaging in a form of religious 
expression that would enable us to put into action one of our basic religious beliefs -
commonality of ownership and action in an effort toward the Holy United Order under 
the leadership of the FLDS Church. 
25. Our understanding in voting to sustain and consecrate to the Trust was that, 
following principles of internal Church governance, if it were to be determined that the 
Board of Trustees was in breach of the Trust, they would have to be removed and 
replaced through Priesthood authority or, if the breaches were such as to render the Trust 
incapable of pursuing its religious mission, the Trust would have to be terminated. 
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26. In 2005, we became aware that the Third District Court had determined that 
the Board of Trustees was in breach of the Trust and had removed the Board and 
appointed a Special Fiduciary to administer the Trust. 
27. Shortly after he was appointed, I met the Special Fiduciary, Bruce Wisan. 
Mr. Wisan came down to Short Creek and asked to meet with some of us. Among the 
first things he said to me was that, based on the ruling of the Third District Court, he was 
now the "State-Ordained Bishop" or "SOB." He said this with a humorous expression, as 
if he found it clever and amusing, but it was a clear mockery of our faith and institutions. 
28. As "State-Ordained Bishop," the Special Fiduciary has proceeded to create 
his own secular hierarchy and to staff it with functionaries who are unmistakably 
identified with those who are opposed to the FLDS Church and its historic role in the 
spiritual and economic life of our communities. 
29. All of the members of the Advisory Board of the Reformed Trust are avowed 
enemies of the FLDS Church. 
30. Whereas before the members took their requests to the ordained Bishop, who 
administered the Trust lands and the Bishop's storehouse under his Holy calling and 
divine inspiration, members now are supposed to go through the Special Fiduciary and 
have their requests considered by allegedly "neutral principles" by people who are 
anything but "neutral" in their views of the FLDS Church. 
31. The Special Fiduciary has stated to me personally, and admitted in open 
court, that one of the driving factors in his decision as to how to manage and dispose of 
Trust properties is whether he has reason to believe a particular Trust participant will 
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continue to practice the Holy United Order and consecrate the property to the Church in 
the future. 
32. This effectively requires me and my fellow Association members to forswear 
any intention ever to consecrate the property to the FLDS Church in fulfillment of what 
we believe to be a commandment of God. 
33. I have read and am familiar with court pleadings filed in the Third District 
Court action where the Special Fiduciary discusses what he calls a "strategic plan to 
subdivide Trust property so that it can be conveyed to members of the beneficiary class in 
a religiously neutral manner in furtherance of the Reformed Trust's purpose to serve the 
'just wants and needs' (primarily housing) of all persons who consecrated to the Trust." 
34. The Special Fiduciary's court filings refer to the determination of FLDS 
members' "just wants and needs" in accordance with Holy Scripture and divine 
revelation as "the whim of leadership"; to the FLDS Church's religious beliefs and 
practices in making such determinations as "discriminating] on the basis of religion" and 
operating "in a religiously discriminatory manner"; and to me and my fellow Association 
members as "saboteurs." 
35. The Special Fiduciary's characterizations of the Trust's administration before 
the State takeover speak volumes about how the state views the manner in which the 
Trust was previously administered in accordance with its fundamental, inherent nature as 
a religious institution. Of course the Trust was operated under religious principles, and of 
course the Trust "discriminated" on the basis of determinations made in accordance with 
Holy Scripture and divine revelation. Although it appears the Special Fiduciary believes 
8 
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churches can be required not to follow their own doctrines but only "neutral principles" 
dictated by the state, that is contrary to our beliefs, including our belief that all people 
may worship as they choose and make their own determinations as to matters of church 
doctrine like "just wants and needs." 
36. In other court filings, the Special Fiduciary has revealed his intention to 
pursue the sale of Trust properties that hold special economic, social, historical and 
spiritual significance for the FLDS community, including the Harker Farm, the Berry 
Knoll Farm and the FLDS Temple in Eldorado, Texas. 
37. The Special Fiduciary says he needs to sell this property not to meet the 
needs of the people for food, clothing and shelter - which needs are dire - but to "resolve 
the current cash crunch problem" - a multi-million-dollar debt incurred by the Special 
Fiduciary's for legal, accounting and other fees, including payment of fees incurred in the 
defense of the Special Fiduciary and his functionaries charged (one convicted) with 
illegal and unconstitutional actions in the course of their duties. 
38. The Third District Court scheduled a hearing on the Special Fiduciary's 
proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm for November 14, 2008, in St. George, Utah. 
Thousands of Petitioner Association members turned out for that hearing in an 
unprecedented display. We wanted the Third District Court, which had consistently said 
it wanted to hear from us, to hear from us, even though we had been denied any formal 
standing in the court. 
39. Berry Knoll Farm has long been of central economic, social and historical 
value to the FLDS Church as a part of the prophetic vision and divine command that the 
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Short Creek area will "become a garden spot of the west" and sustain the faithful 
members of the community through consecration of its bounty to the Bishop's 
Storehouse. 
40. Berry Knoll Farm also has deep religious and historical significance for me 
and my fellow Association members. We believe that the location of a temple site is 
divinely revealed to Church leaders, and that as a result of a specific prophecy Berry 
Knoll is a sacred site upon which a temple will be constructed, even if the Church 
leadership is "scattered," so long as they remain faithful. See documents attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
41. The Special Fiduciary apparently disagrees with our faith, telling the Third 
District Court he has unspecified but allegedly "credible information" that the "temple 
site prophecy was rejected by later FLDS leadership, who stated that the FLDS church 
would not build a temple on Berry Knoll." He challenges our claims as to the sacred 
nature of Berry Knoll as based on "a few old documents" rather than "evidence from any 
authorized current leader of the FLDS Church indicating that the Berry Knoll site is 
considered 'sacred ground.5" Without pointing to any source document or witness, but 
insisting he has been "advised" of the truth in this matter of competing claims, the 
Special Fiduciary thus places himself in the middle of an ecclesiastical dispute. 
42. In fact, the Special Fiduciary appears poised to come down on one side of 
that dispute, since he was forced to admit in papers filed in Third District Court that he 
intended to sell the property to an entity controlled by one Kenneth C. Knudson of 
Centennial Park, Arizona. 
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43. Kenneth Knudson is a member of another religious sect with a competing 
claim to Berry Knoll. His brother Joseph Knudson owns and conducts the day-to-day 
operations of an entity listed as one of the 'Vested Managers" of the entity that plans to 
buy Berry KnolL 
44. On behalf of Petitioner Association members, and to represent their interests 
in the distribution of UEP Trust assets, I actively participated as a representative of the 
FLDS Church in the recent settlement negotiations and at the Third District Court's July 
29, 2009 "public hearing." Besides us few FLDS Church representatives allowed to 
participate, there were no other participants, and there are none that I am aware of in the 
litigation, that specifically represent the interests of the faithful FLDS Church members 
or in the Church generally in the areas where Trust lands are located. Once again, 
however, thousands of Petitioner Association members from the United States and 
Canada came to Salt Lake for that hearing, even though we have consistently been denied 
formal party status in that and all other proceedings before Judge Lindberg. 
45. As a result of being taken over by the State and its religious mission, purpose 
and guiding tenets wholly secularized, the Reformed Trust operates with the clear 
purpose and effect of substituting what is fundamentally a religious institution guided by 
divine inspiration with a wholly secular mirror image, thus fundamentally suppressing the 
FLDS Church's longstanding and historical role as the communitarian and spiritual 
center of life in the communities of Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona where 
Plaintiff association members reside. 
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46. More importantly, the State of Utah's sustained and systemic attack on the 
Holy United Order amounts to punishment for following our beliefs by consecrating our 
property to the good of the whole. 
47. In addition, the State is making us pay those engaged in the attack - people 
who are opposed to the Church's religious mission and purposes, which the Trust was 
intended to advance - but has denied us any standing to object or require accountability. 
48. The extent of the devastation, spiritual and economic, that the State of Utah's 
actions in this matter have visited and are continuing to visit upon our community of faith 
cannot be overstated. Thousands of us are literally fighting for our survival. We ask this 
Court for nothing more than to apply the United States Constitution to the actions of the 
Third District Court in this case. 
THIS IS THE END OF MY AFFIDAVIT. 
DATED this day of October, 2009. 
^ fyfaft. 
2009. 
WILLIE J^SSOF 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this //, day of October, 
Notary Public y 
Residing in: W/UL, fa^nt. 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ySy/ day of October, 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of die 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIE JESSOP IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT to be served upon the following in the following described manner: 
VIA U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID and EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Timothy Bodily, Esq. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874 
EMAIL: tbodily@utah.gov 
VIA U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID and EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Mark L. Callister 
Jeffrey L. Shields 
Zachary Shields 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
10 E. South Temple, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
EMAIL: ilshicldsfr/.cnmlaw.com 
VIA U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID AND EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Roger H. Hoole 
Gregory N. Hoole 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
EMAIL: rhh(6i hooleking.com 
VIA U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID AND EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East, 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box #142320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
EMAIL: mshunlcftlautah.gov 
VIA U.S. MAIL POSTAGE PREPAID AND EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Peter Stirba 
Stirba & Associates 
215 South State Street, Suite 750 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
EMAIL: pcter(<7 stirba.com 
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VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION and EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
William A. Richards 
Arizona Attorney General's Office 
1275 West Washington 
Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2997 
Fax No.: (602) 364-2214 
EMAIL: bill nehards(a.azag uov 
VIA U.S. MAIL POSTAGE PREPAID AND EMAIL TRANSMISSION: 
Michael D. Zimmerman 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
EMAIL: mzHnmermanfr/,swla\v.com 
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Exhibit A 
"Joseph Musser made prophecies of things that would come to pass. Among these prophecies 
were that a temple would be built on a small hill south of the community called Berry Knoll,.. 
He also prophesied that Short Creek would become a garden spot of the west, one acre of land 
producing more food stuff than 10 acres of the best farm land in Davis County, Utah." 
The Polygamists: A History of Colorado City, Arizona, Benjamin G. Bistline (2004), p. 27 
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Jun, 30. Attended Insurance agents' meeting from 
9 to 11:30. Went with my son Karl to fair grounds where 
he finally obtained his driver's license. I bot tires for the 
car at Sears after trying to make a trade with Mr, W. 
Westonshow. A lot of monkey work or waiting to get 
going by nighttime. 1 called upon Bro. R, C. Allred at 
his home in evening. 
Jul. 1. Wayne Handy spent the night at our house, 
Wayne and my daughters Eula and Shirley and I left 
home in our car about 3:20 a.m., and with Bro. Joseph 
W, Musser (whom we picked up at 4 a.m,), we drove 
via Hi way 9i to Hurricane, 
4
 *G-*4rA», • 
Joseph W. Musser at Hurricane Hill 
thence to Short Creek, Arizona, reaching there by 
11:45 a.m, and found the people mostly well tho sur-
prised to see us, This is Wayne's first visit there, so I 
introduced him wherever we went. Most of the people 
in Short Creek are my relatives. Joseph stopped with his 
wife (my very sWecl sister Fawn, who is the scaled wife 
of Joseph Leslie Broadbent). My son Edson and family 
and my daughters IJOUISC and Florence are OK. My 
dear father (Jos. S. Jessop) not so well but always help-
ing all he can. My brother Fred, too, always sweet and 
helpful. They are moving into the new store building. 
Fawn is Post Mistress and store keeper, along with her 
son David Broadbent. We saw many of the people. 
The purpose of this tiip is to find out how the peo-
ple feci toward Joseph (Musser) and the priesthood call-
ings made thru him. (On hist Sunday, June 30"', Joseph 
asked me lo take him on this trip). Jaseph conversed 
some with Carl Holm on the situation, and Carl seemed 
to feel like he would rather not have Joseph hold a meet-
ing with the people. Joseph and I called upon my Brother 
Richard Jessop, and Richard expressed a finn belief and 
lestamony that Bro. Joseph Musser is the head of the 
Priesthood and he (Richard) would gladly call the i)co-
ple to-gether in a meeting if Joseph desired it so—but 
Brother Roy Johnson was away and is expected back 
this evening, so Joseph decided to wait until Roy could 
be consulted, (Roy Johnson, Richard Jessop, and Carl 
Holm are the head men of the community.) 
Joseph and I, also Eula and Shirley, ate supper with 
Fawn and David's family. Wayne and I visited with 
Edson and Alyne, also Margaret, Irene, and Leota and 
their children, and we slept there. 
Jul. 2. By 7 am. Joseph had walked near 1/2 mile 
to find me at Margaret's place. After breakfast we drove 
to Berry Knoll (at Joseph's desire) about a mile south of 
the town. This is a spot designated for a temple some-
time, so Joseph wanted to stand upon it Leaving the car 
by the road side, Wayne and I helped Joseph to the top-
most eminence of the hill, which climb was about 1/4of 
a mile. It's a beautiful v|ew in all directions and seems 
a delightful place for a Temple of God when the land is 
redeemed from its drought, and Joseph said as we stood 
in the view, 'There will be plenty of water sometime." 
White Wayne went back to the car for his camera, 
Joseph and I prayed together fervently to The Lord in 
behalf of the people, the saints, the Lamaniies, for our 
own mission and callings. Wayne returned but could not 
get the car only a short way up because of the deep sand. 
We assisted Joseph to the car and we dug ourselves out 
of a stuck and returned to Short Creek. 
We found Bro. Roy Johnson in his car near 
Richard's house (south side of town). We invited them 
into our air, and Roy, Richard, Carl Holm, Sr., and Carl 
Holm, Jr., came and sat in our car for more then an 
hour. Bro. Joseph asked Roy to state how he felt toward 
him (Joseph), so Roy said that he knows that Joseph 
holds the keys to Priesthood and he (Roy) will sustain 
him in that position in love and loyalty. Roy also stated 
in about these words, "I stood by Uncle John until the 
end. I was at his elbow, and 1 know you (Joseph) now 
hold the head place, and I will support you as I did him 
(John)." Joseph responded, 'That is fine." 
Bro. Carl Holm, Sn, asked Joseph if he could make a 
statement, Joseph said, "Yes, go ahead/*Then Bro. I lolm 
made a lengthy statement, telling of his conversion and 
conviction of points of doctrine, emphasizing the scripture 
as given by F&ul, viz: "Tho we or an angel from heaven 
preach any other gospel than thai we have preached, let 
him be accursed." Also, "Bro. Musser should be in har-
mony with the Council, dso 'if you are not one, you are 
not mine/ sayeth The Ijord." His statements seemed 
lengthy considering the time and place, tho he was given 
all the rime he wanted to make his statements. 
Joseph called upon mc to speak my thots and 1 did 
so, saying thalY "1 consider the priesthood question a 
serious one. I agree with Bro. Holm in part, but as I see 
the picture and understand priesthood, he has stated the 
!7l 
Held meeting with the Priesthood .,„ (line gone) Sacrament was administered. Stressed need for 
unity, charity, a forgiving spirit, that when we forgive we forget and never judge each other 
without hearing both sides. Sustained the leadership of John and the move to Short Creek. Said 
temple would some time be built there; also spoke of judgments coming on this land. Said the 
Priesthood would be scattered, but enough would be here, if faithful, to protect the righteous with 
the power of their Priesthood. Those who did right would be protected. 
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